

## QUESTION VI

### ON MIRACLES

THERE are ten points of inquiry. (1) Can God do anything in creatures, that is beyond natural causes, or against nature, or contrary to the course of nature? (2) Whether anything that God does against nature or against the course of nature can be called a miracle? (3) Can spiritual creatures work miracles by their own natural power? (4) Can good angels and men work miracles by a gift of grace? (5) Do the demons co-operate in the working of miracles? (6) Have angels or demons bodies naturally united to them? (7) Can angels or demons assume bodies? (8) Can an angel or demon by means of an assumed body exercise the operations of a living body? (9) Should the working of a miracle be ascribed to faith? (10) Are demons compelled by sensible and corporeal objects, deeds or words to work the miracles which appear to be done by the arts of magic?

#### Q. VI: ARTICLE I

Can God Do Anything in Creatures That is Beyond Nature, Against Nature, Or Contrary to the Course of Nature?

[ Con. Gen. iii, 98, 99, 100]

THE first point of inquiry is whether God can do anything in creatures that is beyond or against nature, or contrary to the course of nature: and seemingly he cannot.

1. The (ordinary) gloss on Romans xi, 24, Contrary to nature thou wert grafted, says: "God the author of all natures does nothing against nature."

2. Another gloss on the same passage observes: "God can no more act against the law of nature than he can act against himself." Now he can nowise act against himself because he cannot deny himself (2 Tim. ii, 13). Therefore he cannot act against the order of nature.

3. Just as the order of human justice derives from divine justice, so does the order of nature derive from divine wisdom since it is this that ordereth all things sweetly (Wis. viii,

x). Now God cannot act against the order of human justice: further, he would be the cause of sin which alone is contrary to the order of justice. Since then God's wisdom is no less than his justice, it would seem that neither can he act against the order of nature.

4. Whenever God works in creatures through the innate laws of nature, he does not act against the course of nature. Now God cannot fittingly work in a creature independently of the innate laws of nature. Therefore he cannot fittingly work against the course of nature. The minor proposition is proved as follows. Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 11, 12) that visible apparitions were shown to the patriarchs by means of the angelic ministrations, inasmuch as God governs bodies through spirits. In like manner he governs the lower bodies through the higher (ibid. 4): and it may also be said that he directs all effects through their causes. Since then the laws of nature are implanted in natural causes, it would seem that God cannot fittingly work in natural effects, except by means of the natural laws: and thus he will do nothing contrary to the course of nature.

5. God cannot make yes and no to be true at the same time: because since this is incompatible with the very nature of being as such, it is also incompatible with a creature: and the first of things created was being (De Causis, p. 54). Now the aforesaid principle, being the first principle of all, to which all others are reduced (Metaph. iv), must be implied in every necessary proposition, and its opposite in every impossible proposition. Since then things that are contrary to the course of nature are impossible in nature, for instance that a blind man be made to see, or a dead man to live, they imply the opposite of the aforesaid proposition. Therefore God cannot do what is contrary to the course of nature.

6. A gloss on Ephesians iii says that God does not change his will so as to act against the causes which he had established by his will. Now God established natural causes by his will. Therefore he neither does nor can do anything contrary to them, inasmuch as he cannot change: for to do anything contrary to that which one has deliberately decided would seem to point to a change in one's will.

7. The good of the universe is a good of order, and to this the course of nature belongs. But God cannot act against the good of the universe, since it is due to his sovereign goodness that all things are good in relation to the order of the universe. Therefore God cannot do anything contrary to the order of nature.

8. God cannot be the cause of evil. Now according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iv) evil is the privation of measure, form and order. Therefore God cannot do anything contrary to the course of nature which belongs to the order of the universe.

9. It is written (Gen. ii, 2) that on the seventh day God rested from all the work which he had done, and this because as the (ordinary) gloss observes, he ceased to produce new works. Now in the works of the six days he did nothing contrary to the course of nature: wherefore Augustine (Gen. ad. lit. ii) says that in discussing the works of the six days we do not ask what God might have done miraculously, but what was compatible with nature which he established then. Therefore neither did God afterwards do anything contrary to the course of nature.

10. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii) nature causes order in all things. Now God cannot do anything that is not in order, since according to Romans xiii, i: Those that are of God are well ordered. Therefore he cannot do anything contrary to nature.

11. Nature no less than human reason is from God. But God cannot act against the principles of reason, for instance that the genus be not predicated of its species, or that the side of a square be not proportionate to the diameter. Neither therefore can he act against the principles of nature.

12. The entire course of nature derives from divine wisdom even as the products of art proceed from art, according to Augustine in his commentary on Jo. i, 3, 4: That which was made, was life in him. Now a craftsman does nothing against the principles of his art except by mistake: and this cannot happen to God. Therefore God does nothing contrary to the course of nature.

13. The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text 78) that the manner in which a thing is done follows its natural aptitude to be done in that way. Now what has a natural aptitude to be done as it is done, is not done against nature. Therefore nothing is done contrary to nature.

14. Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo xx) that God cannot do what is in the least way unbecoming. Now it is unbecoming for the course of nature to be changed, while it is

becoming for it to be observed. Therefore it is impossible that God act against the course of nature.

15. Knowledge is to falsehood, as power to the impossible. Now God cannot know what is naturally false. Therefore he cannot do what is contrary to the course of nature, since this is naturally impossible.

16. That which is impossible of itself is more impossible than that which is accidentally impossible, since that which is of itself so and so is more than other things so and so. Now it is accidentally impossible for that which has been not to have been: and yet God cannot do this according to Jerome I and the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2). Therefore neither can God do things that are contrary to the course of nature and impossible in themselves, for instance that a blind man see.

17. According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, i) an action is compulsory when its principle is external, and the person compelled contributes nothing to it. Now nature cannot contribute to things that are done against the course of nature: and thus if they are done by God they will be compulsory and will not last. But this cannot be admitted, since the blind retain their sight after having it restored by God.

18. Every genus is divided into potentiality and act (Phys. iii): and passive potentiality comes under potentiality, while active potentiality comes under act: wherefore nature has no passive potentiality without a corresponding active potentiality, since they come under the same genus, as again the Commentator states (Metaph. ix, text. 11, 17). Now there is no natural active potentiality directed to things contrary to the course of nature: and consequently neither is there a natural passive potentiality. But when a creature has no passive potentiality in respect of a thing, this is said to be impossible, although by virtue of his omnipotence God can do all things. Therefore things that are contrary to the course of nature are impossible through something lacking to creatures, although not by reason of a defect in God's powers.

19. Whatsoever God has done once it would not be unbecoming if he did it always. Yet it would be unbecoming were he to produce all natural effects independently of their natural causes, because in that case natural things would be deprived of their operations. Therefore it is unbecoming for him to produce at times an effect in this lower world

without the agency of natural causes: and if he acts by their means he does nothing against the course of nature. Therefore God does nothing contrary to the course of nature.

20. A natural cause is ordained to its effect essentially, and vice versa. Now God cannot deprive a thing of that which is essential to it, so long as the thing remains: for instance, that a man be not an animal. Therefore he cannot produce an effect without the natural cause that is essentially ordained to that effect: for instance he cannot give sight without the natural causes whence sight is produced.

21. It is unfitting for a greater good to be neglected for a lesser good. Now the good of the universe is greater than any particular good of any thing whatsoever: wherefore Augustine says (Enchir. x) that God made every single thing good, and all things together very good, for the order of the universe. Therefore it is unfitting that God for the spiritual good of an individual man or of a nation, change the course of nature which belongs to the order of the universe, wherein its good consists. Therefore God never does anything contrary to the course of nature.

On the contrary, nature cannot restore a habit to one who is deprived of it: yet this can be done by God: thus it is written (Mt. xi, 5): The blind see, the deaf hear, etc. Therefore God does something contrary to the order of nature. Again, the power of a higher being is not dependent on or limited by the power of a lower being. Now God is above nature. Therefore his power is not limited by that of nature: so that nothing prevents him from acting against the order of nature.

I answer that, without any doubt God can work in creatures independently of created causes, just as he works in all created causes, as shown elsewhere: and by working independently of created causes he can produce the same effects and in the same order as he produces them by their means: or even other effects and in a different order: so that he is able to do something contrary to the common and customary course of nature. We shall realise how true this, is if we consider the views that have been held in opposition to this truth. These are three in number.

The first is that of some early philosophers who contended that these corporeal things do not derive their existence from any higher cause; thus some of them, as Anaxagoras, said that an intelligence was the cause of some kind of movement in them, for instance, a

movement of segregation. According to this opinion natural forms which are the principles of natural actions cannot be influenced, nor their actions hindered, by any supernatural cause: so that nothing can happen contrary to the course of nature, which is unchangeably regulated by these corporeal causes. Now this opinion is false: because the supreme being must needs be the cause of being in all things (Metaph. ii, text. 4), just as that which is supremely hot is the cause of heat in all other things. We have treated this point more fully elsewhere (Sum. Theol., I, Q. xliv, A. i) when we proved that nothing can exist unless it be made by God.

A second opinion in opposition to this truth was held by other philosophers who asserted that God is the cause of all by his intellect. They maintained however that God has a universal knowledge of things inasmuch as he knows himself, and that he himself is the source of all being, but that he has no proper knowledge of each individual being. But, said they, from common and universal knowledge individual effects do not follow except by means of particular knowledge. Thus, if I know that all fornication is to be avoided, I shall not avoid this particular action unless I know that it is fornication. Accordingly they said that particular effects do not proceed from God except in a certain order by means of other causes, of which the higher are more universal, and the lower more particular: and according to this view God is unable to do anything contrary to the order of nature. But this opinion is false: for since God knows himself perfectly, he must needs know all that is in him in any way whatsoever. Now in him is the likeness of every one of his effects, inasmuch as there can be nothing that does not imitate him: and thus it follows that he has proper knowledge of all things, as we have proved elsewhere (Sum. Theol., I, Q. xiv).

The third opinion opposed to the aforesaid truth is that of some philosophers who said that God produces things by natural necessity: so that his works are confined to the course of things appointed by nature, and thus he is unable to act against it. But this again is evidently false: since above all those things that act of natural necessity there must be something that determines nature to one mode of action, as elsewhere (Sum. Th., I, Q. xix, A. 4) we have proved. It is impossible then that God the first agent act of natural necessity: and this again has been proved in several ways in another question (*ibid.* A. 3 and above Q. iii, A. 15).

These three points being established, namely that God is the author of being in all things of nature; that he has proper knowledge and providence in respect of each individual; and that he does not act of natural necessity, it follows that he can act independently of the course of nature in the production of particular effects—either as regards being by

producing in natural things a new form which nature is unable to produce, for instance, the form of glory; or by producing a form in a particular matter, as sight in a blind man: or as regards operation, by restraining the action of nature from doing what it would naturally do, for instance, by hindering fire from burning (Dan. iii, 49, 50), or water from flowing, as happened in the Jordan (Jos. iii, 13).

Reply to the First Objection. Both God and nature act against individual nature: for instance, it is against the nature of this or that particular fire that it be extinguished: wherefore the Philosopher says (*De Coelo et Mundo*, ii) that corruption, decrepitude, and in general all defects are contrary to nature: whereas nothing in nature acts against universal nature. For particular nature denotes the relation of a particular cause to a particular effect, while universal nature denotes the relation of the first agent in nature, which is the heavens, to all agents in the lower world. And seeing that none of the lower bodies acts save by virtue of the heavenly body, it is impossible for any natural body to act against universal nature: while the very fact that anything acts against a particular nature, is in accord with universal nature. Now just as the heaven is the universal cause in respect of lower bodies, so God is the universal cause in respect of all beings, and in comparison with him even the heaven is a particular cause. For nothing prevents one and the same cause from being universal in relation to things below it, and particular in relation to those above it: thus if we take the predicables, animal is universal in relation to man, and particular in relation to substance. Accordingly just as by the power of the heavens something can happen that is contrary to this or that particular nature, and yet not contrary to nature simply, since it is in accord with universal nature: even so by the power of God something can occur that is contrary to universal nature which is dependent on the power of the heavens; without being contrary to nature simply, since it will be in accord with the supremely universal nature, dependent on God in relation to all creatures. It is in this sense that Augustine in the gloss quoted says that God does nothing contrary to nature: wherefore he goes on to say, because "the nature of each thing is what God does in it."

The Reply to the Second Objection is evident from what has just been said: because in that gloss Augustine refers to the supreme law of nature which is God's ordinance with regard to all creatures.

Reply to the Third Objection. As we have already explained although God can do something contrary to the relation between one creature and another, he cannot do anything contrary to a creature's relation to himself. Now the justice of a man consists chiefly in his being duly referred to God: so that God cannot do anything contrary to the

order of justice. On the other hand the course of nature is dependent on the relation of one creature to another, wherefore God can act against the course of nature.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. just as God can produce effects in nature without employing natural causes, so also can he without the ministry of the angels: but the reason for his doing so is not the same in both cases. He acts independently of natural causes in order that being unable to ascribe the effect to visible causes we may be compelled to attribute it to some higher cause, and that thus a visible miracle may be a manifestation of the divine power. But the activities of the angels are not visible; wherefore their ministrations do not hinder us from ascribing something to the divine power. For this reason Augustine does not say that God is unable to work without the ministry of the angels, but that he does not do so.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. just as God cannot make yes and no to be true at the same time, so neither can he do what is impossible in nature in so far as it includes the former impossibility. Thus for a dead man to return to life clearly involves a contradiction if we suppose that his return to life is the natural effect of an intrinsic principle, since a dead man is essentially one who lacks the principle of life. Wherefore God does not do this but he makes a dead man to regain life from an extrinsic principle: and this involves no contradiction. The same applies to other things that are impossible to nature, and which God is able to do.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. God does not change his will when he does anything. contrary to natural causes: because from eternity he foresaw and decreed that he would do what he does in time. Wherefore he so ordered the course of nature, that by his eternal decree he preordained whatsoever he would at some time do independently of that course.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. When God does anything outside the course of nature he does not put aside the entire order of the universe wherein its good consists, but the order of some particular cause to its effect.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Penal evil is contrary to the order between one part of the universe and another part;

and in like manner every evil that is a defect of nature. But sinful evil is contrary to the order between the whole universe and its last end, inasmuch as the will in which sinful evil resides, is deprived by sin of its order in relation to the last end of the universe. Wherefore God cannot be the cause of this evil: Since he cannot act against the latter order, although he can act against the former.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. God does not work miracles except in creatures that already exist, and in some way existed already in the works of the six days. Hence miraculous works, in a manner of speaking, existed already materially in the works of the six days, although it was not befitting that anything should be done miraculously contrary to the course of nature, when nature itself was being established.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Nature is the cause of order in all natural things, but not in all things absolutely speaking. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The logician and the mathematician consider things in their abstract principles, so that in logic and mathematics nothing is impossible except what is contrary to the abstract notion of a thing. These things involve a contradiction and consequently are of themselves impossible. Such impossibilities God cannot do. On the other hand the physicist studies individual matter, wherefore he reckons as an impossibility, even that which is impossible to an individual. But nothing prevents God from being able to do what is impossible to lower agents.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. The divine art is not fully extended in producing creatures: so that God can by his art do something otherwise than the course of nature requires. Hence although he can do something contrary to the course of nature it does not follow that he can act against his art: since even a human craftsman can by his art produce another work in a different way to that in which he produced a previous work.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The Philosopher refers to things that are done in nature: for such things are so done, as they have a natural aptitude to be done.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. It is fitting that the course of nature be observed forasmuch as it is ordained by divine providence: wherefore if it be in the order of divine providence that something be done otherwise, there is no reason why it should not be.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. A thing cannot be said to be false simply or false relatively in the same way as a thing is impossible simply or impossible relatively: if a thing is false at all, it is false simply. Hence God cannot know falsehood, even as he cannot do what is simply impossible. And yet just as he can do what is relatively impossible, so is he able to do what is relatively unknown.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. All accidental things are to be reduced to something per se; wherefore nothing prevents that which is accidentally impossible from being, more impossible when reduced to that which is impossible in itself: thus snow by its whiteness dazzles the eyes more than the whiteness of the wall does, because the whiteness of the snow is greater than that of the wall. In like manner that Socrates did not run is an impossibility because it is reduced to a per se impossibility, namely that the past has not been; which involves a contradiction. Consequently nothing prevents this from being more impossible than that which is impossible relatively, although accidentally it is not impossible.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. In every natural thing there is natural order and relationship to all higher causes: and therefore things that happen to lower bodies through the influence of the heavenly bodies, are not compulsory, although they may seem contrary to the natural movements of these lower bodies, as evidenced in the ebb and flow of the sea consequent upon the movement of the moon. And much less compulsory is what God does in this lower world.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. A higher active force can produce a higher effect with the same material: thus nature can produce gold out of earth and a mixture of other elements, which art cannot do. Hence it is that the same thing has a potentiality for various effects, according to its relation to various agents. Wherefore nothing prevents created nature from being in potentiality to certain effects that can be produced by the power of God, and which cannot be produced by a lower power: this potentiality of nature is called obediential forasmuch as every creature obeys its Creator.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Every created thing is ordered to its own operation by God: and thus it is not unfitting if by divine providence a certain effect is produced without the co-operation of nature.

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. Although God produces an effect without the action of its natural cause, he does not destroy the relation between cause and effect. Thus the fiery furnace retained its relation to burning, although it burned not the three children in the furnace.

Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. When God does anything contrary to the course of nature, the whole order of the universe is not subverted, but the course resulting from the relation between one particular thing and another. Hence it is not unfitting if at times something is done contrary to the course of nature for man's spiritual welfare which consists in his being ordered to the last end of the universe.

#### Q. VI: ARTICLE II

Can Everything That God Does Without Natural Causes Or Contrary to the Course of Nature Be Called A Miracle?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. cv, A. 7]

THE second point of inquiry is whether everything can be called a miracle that God does without natural causes or against the order of nature: and seemingly the answer should be in the negative.

1. We may gather from Augustine (Super Joan. Tract. viii: De Trin. iii, 5) that a miracle "is something difficult which seldom occurs, exceeding the faculty of nature and so far surpassing our hopes as to compel our astonishment." Now God sometimes acts against the course of nature even in very little things, for instance when he made wine from water (Jo. ii), and yet he did this without natural causes. Therefore not everything that God does independently of natural causes should be called a miracle.
2. That which often happens should not be described as occurring seldom. Yet at the time of the apostles God often wrought works without natural causes; thus it is related (Acts v.

15) that they brought forth the sick into the streets, etc. Hence such things were not of rare occurrence, and consequently were not miracles.

3. What nature can do is not above the faculty of nature. Now sometimes without natural causes God does things that could be done by nature: as when our Lord healed Peter's mother-in-law of the fever with which she was stricken. This then was not beyond the faculty of nature and was not miraculous.

4. A dead man cannot live again through the action of a natural cause. Now the saints look forward to the resurrection of the dead when God will raise all the dead to life at the end of the world: wherefore we say in the creed: I look for the resurrection of the dead. Therefore not everything that God does beyond the faculty of natural causes, surpasses human hope; wherefore such a thing is not a miracle.

5. The creation of heaven and earth, or the creation of a rational soul is a work of God surpassing other active causes: for God alone can create, as we have proved above (Q. iii, AA. 1, 4: Sum. Th., I., Q. xlv, A. 5). Yet these cannot be called miracles, since they are not done for the manifestation of grace, for which purpose alone miracles are wrought according to Augustine, but for the establishment of nature. Therefore not everything that God does beyond the faculty of nature is a miracle.

6. The conversion of a sinner is a work of God beyond the faculty of nature: and yet it is not a miracle, but rather the end of a miracle, since miracles are wrought in order that men be converted to God. Therefore not everything that God does beyond the faculty of nature is a miracle.

7. It is more astonishing if a thing be done by one who is less powerful than if it be done by one who is more powerful. Now God is more powerful than nature: yet nature's works are not called miracles, for instance, the healing of a sick man, or the like. Much less then should it be called a miracle when it is wrought by God.

8. Monsters are contrary to nature, and yet they are not described as miraculous. Therefore not everything that is contrary to nature is miraculous.

9. Miracles are wrought in confirmation of the faith. Now the Incarnation of the Word was not intended as an argument in confirmation, but to be an object, of faith. Therefore it was not a miracle: and yet it was the work of God alone without the action of any other cause. Therefore not everything that God does beyond the faculty of nature is a miracle.

On the contrary, Augustine says that things follow a threefold course: they may be either natural or voluntary or marvellous. Now those things which God does beyond the faculty of natural causes belong neither to the course of nature, nor to the course of voluntary things, since neither nature nor created will has any effective part in them. Therefore they belong to the order of wonders: and thus they are miracles.

Again, Richard of St. Victor says that a miracle is a work of the Creator manifestive of divine power. Now this applies to those of God's works which surpass natural causes. Therefore they are miracles.

I answer that the word miracle is derived from *mirari* (to be astonished). Now two things concur in making us astonished, as we may gather from the Philosopher (*Metaph.* i, 2). One is that the thing which astonishes us has a hidden cause: the second is that in that which astonishes us we perceive something that would seem to be in contradiction with the cause of our wonder: thus someone might be astonished if he saw iron rising towards a magnet, through not knowing the magnet's power, since apparently the iron ought by its natural movement to tend downwards. This happens in two ways: for a thing may be wonderful in itself, or it may be wonderful to us. A thing is wonderful to us, when the cause of that which astonishes us is hidden, not simply, but to this or that individual, and when the thing at which we marvel has in reality no disposition inconsistent with the marvellous effect, but only in the opinion of the person who marvels. The result is that what is wonderful or astonishing to one person, is not wonderful or astonishing to another; thus one who knows of the magnet's power through having been taught or had experience of it, is not astonished at the aforesaid effect: whereas an ignorant person is astonished.—A thing is wonderful or marvellous in itself when its cause is simply hidden, and when the thing has a contrary disposition to the visible effect. Such things may be called not only actually or potentially wonderful, but also miracles, as having in themselves a cause for admiration. Now the most hidden cause and the furthest removal from our senses is God who works most secretly in all things: wherefore those effects are properly called miracles, which are produced by God's power alone on things which have a natural tendency to the

opposite effect or to a contrary mode of operation: whereas effects produced by nature, the cause of which is unknown to us or to some of us, as also those effects, produced by God, that are of a nature to be produced by none but God, cannot be called miraculous but only marvellous or wonderful. For this reason a miracle in its definition is described as being above the order of nature in the words exceeding the faculty of nature, to which on the part of the thing done corresponds the word difficult. Again it is described as transcending our knowledge, in the words so far surpassing our hopes as to compel admiration, to which on the part of the thing done correspond the words which seldom occurs: since when we are accustomed to an occurrence it becomes more familiar to our knowledge.

Reply to the First Objection. The difficulty mentioned in the definition of a miracle refers to the greatness of the thing not in itself, but in comparison with the faculty of nature: wherefore every effect is reckoned to be difficult that God works in any little thing, if that effect surpasses the faculty of nature.

Reply to the Second Objection. A miracle is described as seldom occurring because it is contrary to the usual course of nature, even were it to be repeated day after day. Thus the transubstantiation of bread into Christ's body occurs every day, yet it ceases not to be miraculous: because the things that happen generally in the whole order of the universe are to be described as usual occurrences rather than what happens in one individual thing alone.

Reply to the Third Objection. It is customary to divide the miraculous works of God into those which are done above, those which are done against, and those which are done without nature.—A miracle is above nature when God produces an effect which nature is wholly incapable of producing. This happens in two ways. First, when God induces into matter a form which nature is utterly unable to induce, for instance, the form of glory which God will induce into the bodies of the elect; and again the Incarnation of the Word. Secondly when nature, although able to induce a particular form into some matter, is unable to induce it into this particular matter: thus nature is able to produce life, but not to produce it in this corpse. A miracle is contrary to nature, when nature retains a disposition contrary to the effect produced by God: for instance when he prevented the three children in the furnace from being hurt, while the fire retained the power to bum; and when the waters of the Jordan stood (Jos. iii, 16) while retaining the force of gravity; and again when a virgin gave birth to a son.—A miracle is done by God without nature, when he produces an effect that nature can produce, but in a manner of which nature is incapable. This may

be either through lack of the instruments which nature is wont to employ, as when Christ changed water into wine (Jo. ii): for nature can do this in a certain way, the water absorbed by the vine for the purpose of nourishment being converted in due time into the juice of the grape by the process of assimilation: or, because the effect is produced by God more copiously than when produced by nature, for instance, the frogs that were brought forth in Egypt (Exod. viii, 6): or because it is produced in less time than nature can produce it, as when a person is instantly cured through the prayer of a saint, for nature could have done this, yet not at once but by degrees, not now but at another time: for instance, the miracle already quoted wrought on Peter's mother-in-law. Evidently then all such works, if we take into account both the substance and the manner of the thing done, surpass the faculty of nature.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The coming resurrection of the dead is beyond the hope of nature, but not beyond the hope of grace. This twofold hope is mentioned (Rom. iv, 18): Who against hope believed in hope.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Heaven, earth and rational souls in the natural order cannot be created by any cause other than God: wherefore the creation of these is not a miracle.

The same answer applies to the Sixth Objection as regards the conversion of a sinner.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Nature's works are also God's works, but, the miracles wrought by God are not wrought by nature: and thus the argument does not conclude. Moreover, the action of nature is manifest to us, whereas God is a hidden cause: for which reason God's works are more wonderful to us than the works of nature.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Monsters are a result that is contrary to a particular nature, but not to universal nature.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. In the words of the saints the Incarnation is the miracle of miracles, because it is greater than all other miracles, and because all other miracles are ordered to it. For this reason not only does it lead us to believe in other articles of faith, but other miracles lead us to believe in it: since nothing prevents one miracle from leading

to faith in another, as, for instance, the raising of Lazarus leads us to believe in a future resurrection.

#### Q. VI: ARTICLE III

##### Can Spiritual Creatures Work Miracles by Their Natural Power?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. cx, AA. 1 seqq.: Con. Gen. III, 103]

THE third point of inquiry is whether spiritual creatures can work miracles by their natural power: and seemingly they can.

1. That which can be done by a lower power, can a fortiori be done by a higher power. Now the power of a spiritual creature surpasses that of a corporeal creature: wherefore it is written (Job xli, 24): There is no power upon earth that can be compared with him. Therefore a spiritual creature can produce the same effects as nature. But when a natural effect is produced, not by a natural but by a hidden cause, it is a miracle. Therefore the spiritual creature can work miracles.
2. The more actual a thing is the more is it active, inasmuch as activity is in proportion to actuality. Now the forms that are in rational creatures are more actual than the forms which are in corporeal creatures, because they are more immaterial: and consequently they are more active. But the forms that are in a corporeal nature produce their like in nature. Much more therefore are the forms in the mind of a spiritual creature capable of doing this: so that a rational creature can produce natural effects without natural causes: and this is a miracle.
3. An angel's intelligence is more akin to the divine intelligence than a man's is. Now in the human intelligence there are active forms residing in the practical intellect, such as the forms of art. Much more then are these active forms in an angel's intelligence: inasmuch as it is evident that the ideas in the divine intellect are supremely active.

4. It might be said that the active forms in the angelic mind are employed in the production of effects by means of a corporeal agent in the same way as forms in the human mind.—On the contrary any power that cannot come into action except by means of a corporeal instrument, is uselessly bestowed on one who has no bodily organs: thus the power of locomotion would be useless to an animal unless it had the means to move. But an angel has not a body naturally united to him. Therefore his power needs no corporeal agent in order to do its work.

5. Any power whose field of action exceeds that of its organ can perform some actions without that organ: thus since the eye's field of action is not equal to the whole power of the soul, the latter performs many actions without the eye. Now a body cannot be in proportion to the whole power of an angel. Therefore an angel can produce certain effects without employing corporeal agents: and thus seemingly he can work miracles by his natural power.

6. An angel's power surpasses all corporeal power more than the body of the heavens surpasses the elements. Now certain effects are produced in this lower world by the power of a heavenly body independently of the action the active and passive qualities that are the forces proper to the elements. Much more then can certain effects be produced in nature by the power of an angel, without the aid of the powers of natural bodies.

7. According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) all bodies are governed by God through the rational spirit of life; and Gregory says the same (Dial. iv.: so that seemingly the movements of the heavens and of all nature are controlled by the angels even as the movements of the human body are controlled by the soul. Now the soul produces forms in the body independently of the natural active forces of the body: thus a mere fancy makes a man grow hot or cold, or become feverish or even leprous according to physicians. A fortiori then it is possible that by the mere concept of the angel who moves the heavens certain effects be produced in this lower world without the action of natural causes: and thus an angel can work a miracle.

8. It will be said perhaps that this is due to the fact that the soul is the form of the body, whereas an angel is not the form of a corporeal creature.—On the contrary, whatsoever effects result from the soul's operation, are produced by the soul as moving, and not as informing the body: since by its operation it is not the body's form but its mover. Now the

aforesaid effects of the soul on the body are consequent upon impressions of the soul in imagining something. Therefore they are produced by the soul as mover but not as form.

9. The reason why God can work wonders is because his power is infinite. Now in *De Causis* (prop. xvi) it is stated that the power of an intelligence is infinite especially over the lower world. This can be proved from the fact that an intelligence causes the heavenly movement, as proved above, which has a natural aptitude to be everlasting: and only an infinite power can cause an everlasting movement (*Phys. viii*). Therefore it would seem that angels can work miracles even by their natural power.

10. It is also stated in *De Causis* (Prop. xvii) that a united force is stronger than one that is divided: and the Commentator says that the power of an intelligence the more it is concentrated and united, the greater and stronger it is, and the more capable of working wonders. Now the Commentator is speaking there of an intelligence's natural power, since he knew not of the power of grace. Therefore by his natural power an angel can work miracles.

11. But to this it might be replied that an angel can work wonders not by his own power, but by employing the forces implanted in nature by God, in order to produce the desired result.—On the contrary, these natural germs which contain the active forces of nature cannot be employed so as to produce a certain effect otherwise than by local movement. Now seemingly it amounts to the same that bodies obey or do not obey a spiritual substance whether as to local movement or as to other kinds of movement: since all natural movement, has its distinctive and definite mover. Hence if angels have at their command the use of these germs in the production of an effect in nature by means of local movement, they will also be able by the movements of alteration or of generation to induce a form into matter by their mere command: and this is to work wonders.

12. The power to induce a form into matter, and the power to prevent its induction are in the same genus: thus the form of fire is induced into matter by the power of a body, and it is also the power of a body that prevents the induction of that form. Now a natural agent is prevented by the power of a spiritual creature from-inducing a form into matter. Thus it is related that by virtue of some particular writing a man was not burnt after being cast into a furnace: and clearly this was not the work of God who protects his saints from torture on account of their merits and not for the sake of any writing: so that this must have been a work of the devil's power. It would seem therefore, with equal reason, that a spiritual

creature can at will induce a form into matter without any corporeal agency. And yet one would reckon it a miracle that a man be not burnt when cast into the fire, as in the case of the three children.

13. A form that is in the imagination or in the senses is superior to a form in corporeal matter forasmuch as it is more immaterial. Now a spiritual creature can produce a form in the imagination or senses, so that a thing appears otherwise than it is. Thus Augustine says (De Civit. Dei xviii, 18): Verily the demons do not create substantial beings, they only change the outward appearance of things created by the true God: and afterwards he adds that they do, this by acting on the imagination. Much more therefore can an angel produce a form in corporeal matter: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

14. To this it might be replied that the demon's action on the imagination does not consist in the production of new forms but in the composition and division of forms already existing.—On the contrary the soul is a more noble being than a corporeal nature. If then a demon can by his power produce what is the proper operation of the sensitive soul, namely composition and division of images, one would think that a fortiori he is able by his power to produce the operations of a corporeal nature: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

15. As power is to power so is operation to operation. Now an angel's power does not depend on the power of a corporeal creature. Neither then does his operation depend on that of a corporeal creature: and therefore he can work miracles independently of natural causes.

16. Just as to make a thing out of nothing argues infinite power by reason of the infinite distance between being and nothing; even so is it possible to a finite power to reduce a thing from potentiality to act. Now the angels' power surpasses all other finite powers. Therefore by his power an angel can bring into actuality all the forms that are in the potentiality of matter, without the action of any natural cause: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

17. An agent that is hindered acts not but is passive. Now the angel that acts on corporeal things is in no way passive to them. Therefore he is not prevented in his action from working miracles by acting independently of natural causes.

On the contrary God works miracles inasmuch as nature is subject to him. But it is not subject to the angels: since he hath not subjected unto angels the world (to come) (Heb. ii, 5). Therefore angels cannot work miracles by their natural power.

Again, Augustine (De Trin. ii, 10) after carefully discussing this question, concludes: "It is good for me to be mindful of my limitations, and I would have my brethren remember theirs, lest human weakness should go further than is safe. How angels do these things, or rather how God does them through his angels, my sight is not keen enough to see, my reason too diffident to unravel, my mind too slow to grasp; nor can I answer with assurance all the queries that could be made on this matter, as though I were an angel myself, or a prophet, or an apostle." Wherefore employing the same moderation, without dogmatizing and without prejudice to a better opinion, we shall discuss the question so far as reason and authority will avail to elucidate it.

It must be observed then that in regard to the point at issue philosophers have disagreed. Avicenna held that the spiritual substance which moves the heavens produces effects in the lower bodies not only by means of the celestial movement but even independently of any bodily action: for he contended that corporeal matter is much more obedient to the concept and command of the aforesaid spiritual substance than to any counter agents in nature or to any corporeal agent. It was owing to this cause, he maintained, that sometimes unwonted disturbances take place in the air, and extraordinary cures of diseased persons; which we call miracles. He gives as an instance the movement of the body by the soul inasmuch as when the latter is affected by a mere imagination, the body without any corporeal agency, is affected by heat or cold, by fever or even by leprosy. This view is quite in keeping with the principles laid down by him. For he holds that natural agents do no more than dispose matter: and that substantial forms are bestowed by a spiritual substance which he calls the giver of forms: the result being that matter in the natural course obeys the spiritual substance as regards the reception of the form therefrom. No wonder then if a spiritual substance produce certain forms in matter outside the ordinary course of corporeal agents and by the sole command of its will. For if matter obeys a separate substance in receiving a substantial form, it is only reasonable that it obey also in receiving the dispositions to a form: for this clearly requires less power. In the opinion of Aristotle, however, and of those who follow him, the above view cannot stand. Aristotle in fact advances two arguments to prove that forms are not stamped on matter by a separate substance, but are brought into act from the potentiality of matter by the action of a form existing in matter. The first of these arguments is given in Metaph. vii, 8,

and is based on the principle which he there proves, that what is made is properly speaking the composite, and not form or matter: since it is the composite which properly speaking has being. Now every agent produces its like: wherefore that which gives existence to natural things by generation, must needs be something composite and not a form without matter, in other words it cannot be a separate substance. The other argument, to be found in Phys. viii, is that whereas the same thing has a natural aptitude to produce always the same effect, and since that which is generated or corrupted or altered, increased or diminished is not always in the same condition, it follows that whatsoever generates or moves with the aforesaid kinds of movement is not always in the same condition, but passes from one state to another. But this cannot be a separate substance, because all such substances are unchangeable, and anything that is changed is a body (Phys. vi). Consequently the immediate cause of the reduction of a form into act by generation or alteration, is a body passing from one mode of being to another through accession and recession by local motion. Hence it is that a separate substance is by its command the immediate cause of local movement in a body, by means of which it causes other movements whereby the thing moved acquires a new form. Now this is reasonable. For local movement is the first and most perfect movement, in that it does not change a thing inwardly but only in point of its place which is external to it: wherefore a corporeal nature receives its first movement, which is local, from a spiritual nature,. Accordingly the corporeal nature obeys the bidding of the spiritual in the point of its natural relation to local movement, but not as regards the reception of a form. This of course is to be understood in reference to the created spiritual nature whose power and essence are confined to a definite genus, and not to the uncreated spiritual substance whose power is infinite, and not confined to a particular genus and the laws governing that genus. In this point faith is in agreement with this opinion: thus Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9) says that corporeal matter does not obey the mere will of the angels. However, the teaching of faith differs somewhat from the position of the philosophers. The philosophers mentioned held that separate substances by their bidding move the heavenly bodies with local movement: and that in this lower world local movement is not caused immediately by a separate substance, but by other causes, natural, voluntary or violent. Thus the commentator Alexander ascribes to the activity of the heavenly bodies all the effects which we ascribe to angels or demons in this lower world. But this seems insufficient: because these effects do not follow a definite course, like those which are produced by the natural action of the higher or lower bodies. Besides there are certain effects that altogether surpass the powers of a heavenly body, for instance, the sudden changing of rods into snakes, and many similar ones. But faith asserts that not only heavenly bodies cause local movement by their bidding, but that other bodies also do so, at God's behest or with his permission. Accordingly by their command they cause local movement in those bodies that have a natural active power to produce a particular effect which however Augustine (Super Gen. ix, 17) calls the seeds of nature. It follows that their operations will not be miraculous but

should rather be described as an art, For miraculous effects are produced by a supernatural cause without recourse to the action of nature: whereas it belongs to art to employ the action of natural principles, in producing an effect which either nature cannot produce, or at least not so efficiently. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "art both copies mature, and makes things which nature cannot make, and sometimes assists nature": thus the physician helps nature to heal by employing those things which have a natural healing power in the process of alteration and digestion. Now in the production of like effects the good or bad angel's art is more efficacious and leads to better results than the art of man: and this for two reasons. First, because seeing that corporeal effects in this lower world depend chiefly on the heavenly bodies, then is an art most effective when the heavenly body's power acts in cooperation with it. Thus in farming and medicine it is useful to notice the movements and position of the sun, moon and stars, whose powers are much better known to the angels by their natural knowledge than to men. Hence they are better fitted to choose the hour at which the power of a heavenly body is more likely to co-operate in producing the desired result. This apparently is the reason why necromancers observe the position of the stars when they invoke the demons.—The second reason is that angels are better acquainted than men with the active and passive powers of the lower bodies, and are therefore able to employ them effectively with greater ease and expedition seeing that bodies move locally at their command. Hence again physicians produce more wonderful results in healing, because they are better acquainted with the powers of natural things.—We may add as a third reason that an instrument acts not only by its own power but also by the power of its mover. Thus a heavenly body produces a certain effect by virtue of the spiritual substance which moves it, for instance, it causes life in animals engendered from corrupt matter; and natural heat as the instrument of the vegetal soul conduces to the formation of flesh. Therefore it is not unreasonable to suppose that natural bodies themselves, forasmuch as they are moved by a spiritual substance, produce a greater effect. We may gather this from the words of Gen. vi, 4 where we read: Giants were upon the earth in those days. For after the sons of God went into the daughters of men, and they brought forth children, these are the mighty men, men of renown: and the (ordinary) gloss commenting on this text observes that it is not incredible that men of this kind were born of women who consorted with demons. It is therefore evident that angels whether good or wicked are unable to work miracles by their natural power: but they can produce certain wonderful effects in which their action is after the manner of an art.

Reply to the First Objection. It is true that the natural power of an angel or demon is greater than the natural power of a body; but it does not extend so far as to induce form into matter immediately, but only by means of a body. Hence it does this more excellently than a body since the first mover excels the second in action.

Reply to the Second Objection. The forms of natural things in the angelic mind are more actual than forms existing in matter: wherefore they are the immediate principle of a more perfect operation namely of understanding. But they are not the immediate principle of that operation which is the transmutation of matter; but they operate through the medium of the will, and the will through the (motive) power, which power is the immediate cause of local movement, by means of which they are the cause of other movements, and a kind of cause of the induction of form into matter.

Reply to the Third Objection. The forms in the human mind do not produce artifacts save through the will, the motive power, the natural organs and the craftsman's tools.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. A power that can employ an organ which serves it in all its operations must have that organ united to it; thus the eye is united to the faculty of sight. But no body could serve an angel so far as to equal his power: hence an angel has not a body actually united to him. For this reason those philosophers who held that separate substances produce no effects here below except by means of the heavens, said that a spiritual substance is united to the heavens as 'its instrument, and this they called the heavens' soul: and that besides this there is another spiritual substance, not united to the heavens, by which the heavens' soul is moved as a man is moved by the object of his desire, and this spiritual substance they called intelligence.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Although an angel causes the movement of the heavens, he can by his act of intelligence bring his action to bear on things here below, independently of the heavens' movement, and of any body whatsoever, by moving other bodies: and yet he is unable to induce a form into matter without employing a corporeal agent.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The heaven being a corporeal agent can be the immediate cause of alteration and information: but it is not so with the angels.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. In the natural order the soul by its bidding moves the body locally: because its appetitive power commands the movement, and the body obeys its bidding, and this is effected by the motive powers affixed to the organs and derived by the body from the soul which informs the body. Other alterations such as heat, cold and

the like derive from the soul by means of local movement. It is also evident that imagination gives rise to a passion whereby in some way the movements of the heart and spirits are affected: and that when the latter are drawn towards the heart or diffused throughout the members the body is likewise affected: and this may lead to disease especially if the matter be so disposed.

This suffices for the Reply to the Eighth Objection.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. An angel's power is said to be infinite over the lower world, inasmuch as his power is not enclosed in matter, and consequently is not confined by an inferior recipient. But it is not infinite in respect of things above it, as already stated: because the angel receives a finite nature from God, so that his substance is confined to a particular genus, and consequently his power is confined to a particular mode of action: and this cannot be said of God.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although an angel does wonderful things as the result of art, they are not miracles, as we have stated above.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although the local movements of the lower bodies as well as other movements are brought about by certain fixed natural causes: the corporeal creature in the natural order obeys the spiritual as regards local movement, but not as regards other movements, for the reason already given: and especially if the power of the spiritual creature is not confined to a particular body, as the soul's power is to the body united to it.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. just as a created spiritual substance cannot by its command give form to matter, even so it cannot by its command prevent a form from being given to matter by a natural agent: and if it does this sometimes, it is by putting a natural obstacle in the way, even though this may not be perceptible to human senses: especially since it can move the flame of a fire locally, so as not to approach the combustible.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. A separate spiritual substance can by its natural power influence the imagination; not indeed by introducing forms into the organ of imagination at his bidding, but by raising a kind of commotion of the spirits and humours. For it is

evident that if these be disturbed, phantoms appear, as instanced in those who are insane or asleep. Besides it is said that certain natural things are effective in producing this disturbance in the imagination, and that magicians make use of them in order to produce illusory visions.

This suffices for the Reply to the Fourteenth Objection.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Even as an angel surpasses a heavenly body in respect of power, so also does he in respect of operation, as stated above: yet not to the extent of inducing form into matter immediately and by his mere bidding.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. A finite power can educe something from potentiality to act; but not any finite power, nor in any way: because every finite power has a fixed mode of action.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. Even though an agent be not hindered it cannot do what is beyond its power; thus fire cannot make a thing cold although there is nothing to prevent it. Hence from the fact that an angel cannot induce a form into matter by his bidding we may infer, not that he is prevented from doing this by some extrinsic agent, but that his natural power does not extend to this.

#### Q. VI: ARTICLE IV

Can Good Angels and Men Work Miracles by Some Gift of Grace?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. cx, A. 4]

THE fourth point of inquiry is whether good angels and men can work miracles by some gift of grace: and it would seem that they can.

1. The angelic orders were established for no other purpose than their operations. Now an order of angels was appointed for the working of miracles: thus Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xxxiv) that signs and miracles are usually wrought by the Virtues. Therefore angels can work miracles by a gift of grace.

2. It is written (Acts vi. 8): Stephen full of grace and fortitude did great signs and wonders among the people. Now grace would not be mentioned first unless the subsequent acts were a consequence thereof. Therefore even men can work miracles by the power of grace.

3. A gift of grace is not given except for the sake of what the recipient may do thereby. Now some received the gratuitous gift to work miracles: thus it is said. (1 Cor. xii, 9, 10): To another is given the grace of healing in one Spirit; to another the working of miracles. Therefore by a gift of grace the saints can work miracles.

4. To this it may be replied that saints are said to work a miracle not by doing it themselves but by impetrating God for the miracle to be done.—On the contrary prayer becomes impetration through those things that make it acceptable to God, namely faith, charity and other virtues pertaining to sanctifying grace. Therefore saints need no gratuitous gift in order to work miracles.

5. Gregory (Dial. ii, 30) says that "those who are devoutly united to God, if the necessity should arise, not unfrequently perform signs in both these ways, working wonders sometimes by their prayers, sometimes by their power." Now when any one does a thing by his power, he does it by his own act and not merely by impetration. Therefore angels and holy men work miracles by their own action.

6. According to Anselm (De Pecc. Orig. xi) there is a threefold course in things, the natural, the voluntary and the wonderful. Now in the natural course of things angels act as standing between God and natural bodies: thus Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says: "All bodies are governed by God through the rational spirit of life;" and Gregory says (Dial. iv. 5): "In this visible world all dispositions are executed through invisible creatures." The same applies to the voluntary course of things: for the angels stand between us and God and are the bearers of the light that they receive from him. Therefore also in the course of wonderful things the angels are intermediaries, inasmuch as miracles are worked through their agency.

7. To this it will be replied that angels are intermediaries as acting not by their own power but by the power of God.—On the contrary, whoever acts by the power of another, is in some way the cause of the effect produced by that power. If then the angels act by the divine power in working miracles, they also are in some way the cause thereof.

8. The Old Law was given by God miraculously, wherefore it is related (Exod. xix, 16) that thunders began to be heard and lightning to flash, and a very thick cloud to cover the mount. Now the Law was given by the angels (Gal. iii, 19). Therefore miracles are wrought by the angels.

9. Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): "Whosoever possesses a thing and gives it not although he would suffer no loss by giving it, does not possess it as it ought to be possessed." Now God has the power to work miracles, and he would lose nothing by imparting it to others. Therefore if he has not bestowed it on others, it would seem that he has not that power as it ought to be possessed. Hence one would infer that God has given to angels and men the power to work miracles.

On the contrary it is written (Ps. lxxi, 18): Who alone worketh great wonders.

Again, according to Bernard (De Disp. et Pracept.) none save the maker of a law can change that law or dispense therefrom: thus in human affairs the emperor alone can change the law, since it was he who made it, Now God alone framed the law of nature's course. Therefore he alone can work miracles by acting independently of the natural course.

I answer that angels inasmuch as they are ministers of the divine power can by a gift of grace do things that surpass their natural power of action: in fact it may be said that angels take an active part in working miracles in three ways.—First, by impetration; and this way may be common to both men and angels.—Secondly, inasmuch as by their natural power they dispose matter for the working of a miracle: thus it is said that they will collect the dust of the dead who by God's power will return to life. This way, however, is peculiar to the angels: since human spirits, through being united to bodies, cannot act on external objects save by means of the body to which in a sense they are chained.—Thirdly, by co-

operation. This way, however, Augustine leaves without coming to a decision. Thus (De Civ. Dei, xxii, 9) he says: "Whether God himself does all these things by himself in his unsearchable way, or by his ministers, or by the souls of the martyrs, or by men as yet in the body, or by the angels to whom he issues his invisible commands (the martyr's part consisting in prayer and impetration but not operation) or by some other way incomprehensible to mortals, in any case these miracles are witnesses of that which proclaims that flesh will rise again to eternity." Gregory, however (Dial. ii, 34) appears to give a decisive answer to the question. He says that holy men even in this life work miracles not merely by prayer and impetration but also authoritatively, and therefore by co-operation: and he proves this both by reason and by examples. His reason is that if men were given the power to become the sons of God, it is not strange that by that power they can work miracles. The examples he offers are that of Peter, who without any previous prayer, pronounced sentence of death on the lying Ananias and Sapphira by mere denunciation (Acts v, 4, 9): and of the Blessed Benedict who "looked on the bonds of a poor countryman and thus loosened them more speedily than it were possible to human hands." Wherefore he concludes that the saints work miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by power. We must now discuss how this may be possible.

It is evident that God alone works miracles by his sole command. Now we find that the divine commands reach the lower rational spirits, namely the souls of men, by means of the higher spirits, namely the angels, as in the promulgation of the Old Law. In the same way the divine command can, through the angelic and human spirits, reach corporeal creatures through whom in a manner of speaking the divine decrees are intimated to nature. Accordingly, human and angelic spirits act somewhat as instruments of the divine power for the accomplishment of a miracle. This does not mean that they are possessed of a permanent habitual power, since then they would be able to work miracles whenever they chose to do so. In fact Gregory declares this to be impossible (l.c.) and proves his assertion by quoting the example of Paul, who prayed that the sting might depart from him (2 Cor. xii, 9) yet his prayer was not granted; and of Benedict, who against his will was detained by the storm that was granted through his sister's prayer. The saints' power to co-operate with God in the working of miracles may be taken to be something after the manner of imperfect forms I called 'intentions,' which are not permanent and are only evoked at the presence of the principal agent, even as 'light in the air, and movement in an instrument. Accordingly the gratuitous gift that is the grace of miracles or of healing can denote a power of this kind: so that this grace which is given that a man may work supernaturally, is like the grace of prophecy which is given that a man may know supernaturally, and by virtue of which the prophet cannot prophesy when he lists, but only when the spirit of prophecy moves him, as Gregory proves (Hom. in Ezech. i). Nor is it strange if in this way God uses the spiritual creature as an instrument in order to produce

wondrous effects in corporeal nature, seeing that he also uses corporeal creatures instrumentally in the sanctification of spiritual creatures, for instance in the sacraments.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, since it is true that God alone works miracles by his authority: and it is also true that he communicates to creatures the power to work miracles, according to the creatures' capacity and the order of divine wisdom: to the effect that a creature may work a miracle ministerially by grace.

#### Q. VI: ARTICLE V

##### Do the Demons Also Co-operate in the Working of Miracles?

THE fifth point of inquiry is whether the demons also cooperate in the working of miracles: and it would seem that they do.

1. It is said (Mt. xxiv, 24): There shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders. Now such things they will not do save by the power of the demons. Therefore demons co-operate in the working of miracles.
2. The sudden healing of a sick man is a miracle: thus Christ worked a miracle when he healed Peter's mother-in-law (Lk. iv). But the demons also can do this: since a sick man may be quickly cured by using medicine: and the demons, being by nature rapid in their movements, and well acquainted with the healing properties of medicines, can apply these so efficaciously, that the sick man is cured at once. Therefore they can work miracles.
3. It is a miracle to make the dumb speak. But it is a yet greater miracle to make a dog speak or sing: and Simon Magus is stated to have done this by a demon's power. Therefore a demon can work miracles.
4. Valerius Maximus relates (Fact. et Dict. Mem. i, 8) that the statue of Fortune situated at Rome on the Latin Way, spoke not once but twice thus: "It is well that you have looked on me oh matrons; rightly have you hallowed me." Now it is a greater miracle for stones than

for the dumb to speak: and yet the latter is miraculous. Therefore seemingly demons can work miracles.

5. History tells us as related by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x 26) that a certain Vestal Virgin in proof of undefiled chastity carried water from the Tiber in a leaky jug, and yet the water was not spilt. Now this could not happen unless the water by some non-natural power were prevented from falling: which was certainly a miracle when the Jordan was divided and the waters stood still. Therefore demons can work miracles.

6. It is much more difficult to change a man into a dumb animal than water into wine. Now the change of water into wine (Jo. ii) was miraculous. Therefore a fortiori is it a miracle to change a man into a dumb animal. Yet men are changed into dumb animals by the demon's power; thus Varro relates, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xviii, 16 seqq.), that when the companions of Diomedes were returning from Troy they were changed into birds, which for a long time afterwards flew around the temple of Diomedes: also that the famous sorceress Circe changed the companions of Ulysses into beasts, and that some Arcadians after crossing a swamp were changed into wolves. Therefore demons can work miracles.

7. Job's trials were evidently brought about through the agency of the devil, since the Lord gave the latter power over all that job had (job i, 12). Now these trials were not effected without a miracle, as evinced by the fire coming down from heaven, and the wind that destroyed his house, resulting in the death of his children. Therefore demons can work miracles.

8. It was a miracle that Moses changed his rod into a serpent (Exod. vii, 10). Therefore it would seem that demons can work miracles.

9. The working of miracles is further removed from man's than from the angels' power. Now miracles are sometimes wrought by wicked men: thus the wicked are made to say (Mt. vii, 22) : Have not we prophesied in thy name... and done many miracles? Therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons also.

On the contrary, at the time of Antichrist the devil will be able to do works of very great power: for he must be loosed a little time (Apoc. xx, 3), which refers to the time of Antichrist. But he will not then work real miracles, since it is clearly stated (2 Thess. ii, 9) that the time of Antichrist will be in all power and signs and lying wonders. Therefore the demons cannot work miracles.

I answer that just as the good angels by grace can do something surpassing the power of nature, so the wicked angels being restrained by divine power are unable to do as much as they might by their natural powers. The reason of this is that as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 9) some things the angels would be able to do if they were permitted to do them, which however they cannot do because, they are not permitted to do, them. (Hence the angels are said to be 'bound' in that they are prevented from doing things to which their natural powers could extend; and to be 'loosed' when by the divine decree they are permitted to do what their nature enables them to do.) While as he says (*ibid.*) some things they cannot do even if permitted to do them, because the kind of nature bestowed on them by God does not permit of their doing such things. Accordingly God does not give them the power to do things that surpass the faculty of their nature, because seeing that a miraculous work is a divine witness to God's power and truth, if the demons whose whole will is diverted to evil, were to receive the power to work miracles, God would vouch for their falsehood, which is repugnant to his goodness. Hence at times they perform by God's permission only such works as seem miraculous to men, and which are within the limits of their natural power. Even so, as explained above (A. 4) by their natural power they can produce as art produces things, those effects only that result from the natural forces contained in bodies, which obey them in respect of local movement; and thus they can employ them in producing an effect in a very short time. Now by means of these powers it is possible for bodies to undergo real transformation: inasmuch as in the natural course one thing is generated from another. Besides this they can by working some kind of change in a body, for instance by disturbing the organ of the imagination, in respect of the various spirits and humours, make things that do not really exist to appear to the imagination: an effect that may be produced by means of certain external bodies, by the application of which things appear different to what they really are, as in cases of delirium or insanity.

Accordingly demons can work wonders in us in two ways first by means of real bodily transformation: secondly by disturbing the imagination so as to delude the senses. But neither of these works is miraculous but is like the work of a craftsman, as explained above (A. 4): wherefore it must be said simply that demons cannot work real miracles.

Reply to the First Objection. Signs and wonders denote things that can be done by natural power, yet to men are marvellous; or again that are done by deceiving the senses as explained above.

Reply to the Second Objection. Nothing prevents a man from being cured more quickly by the devil's art than by nature left to itself: since we find that the same is true of human art. It does not seem however that the demons can cure a man all at once (although certain other effects they can produce almost suddenly) because the medicines that are applied to a man's body effect his cure instrumentally, nature being the principal agent. Wherefore the medicines applied should be such as can be made to act by nature: and if too many were applied they would be not conducive but prejudicial to health. Hence it is that diseases which are by nature incurable, are also incurable by demons. It is different with effects that depend on an external agent as their principal cause. It must be observed, however, that if demons were to effect a sudden cure it would not be a miracle, since to be successful they would have to employ natural forces.

Reply to the Third Objection. Speaking dogs and like works of Simon the magician were quite possibly done by trickery and not in very truth. If, however, they were genuine, it matters not: since the demon did not give a dog the power of speech miraculously as when it is given to the dumb; but by some kind of local movement he made sounds to be heard like words composed of letters and syllables. It is thus that we may understand Balaam's ass to have spoken, although in this case it was by the action of a good angel.

The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection about the statue: for this was done by a devil producing sounds like human speech by means of a movement in the air.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. It is not unlikely that in commendation of chastity the true God through his good angels worked this miracle of the jug holding the water, because whatever good was in the heathens was from God. If, however, it was the work of the demons, this is not inconsistent with what has been said. Local rest and movement are from principles of the same genus, since the same nature that makes a thing move locally makes it rest locally. Wherefore just as demons can move bodies locally so can they prevent them being moved. Nor is it a miracle, as it is when it is done by God, because it results from the demon's natural power in respect of this particular effect.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. These transformations of which Varro speaks were not real but apparent: they were effected by the demon working on a man's imagination by introducing therein a bodily image, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18).

Reply to the Seventh Objection. By God's permission the devils can by a movement of the air cause disaster, even as this may be the natural result of the wind's movements. It was in this way that Job's trials were brought about by the work of the demons.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The (ordinary) gloss mentions two opinions about the works of Pharaoh's magicians. According to one view the rods were not really changed into serpents, but only in appearance by a kind of conjuring trick. But Augustine, quoted in the same gloss says that the change was real. And he proves this with a certain amount of likelihood from the fact that Scripture uses the same word in speaking of the rods of the magicians and the rod of Moses, which of course was changed into a real serpent. Yet the demons' work in changing the rods into serpents was no miracle, since they did it by means of seed collected together, with which they were able to corrupt the rods and change them into serpents. But what Moses did was a miracle, since this was done by the power of God without the cooperation of any power of nature.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Men of evil life are sometimes the heralds of truth, wherefore God works miracles to vouch for the truth of their message: but this cannot be said of the demons,

Reply to the Tenth argument advanced in a contrary sense. It is stated that the devil's power will be let loose at the time of Antichrist, inasmuch as he will be permitted to do many things that he is not allowed to do now: hence he will do many things with the result that those will be seduced who deserved to be seduced for not assenting to the truth. And he will do some things by trickery, wherein there will be neither a true nor a miraculous result. He will also by a real transformation of bodies do some things wherein although the results be real they will not be miraculous, since they will be effected through natural causes. These are called lies on account of the intention with which he will do them, namely to induce men, by his wonderful works, to believe in his lies.

Q. VI: ARTICLE VI

## Have Angels and Demons Bodies Naturally United to Them?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. li, A. 1]

THE sixth point of inquiry is whether angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them: and it would seem that they have.

1. Every animal is composed of a body naturally united to a soul. Now angels and demons are animals; for Gregory says in a homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Ev.) that "as the Jews were rational beings it was fitting that the message should be brought to them by a rational animal, an angel to wit;" and of the demons Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10): "The demons are animals of the atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies." Therefore angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them.
2. Origen says (Peri Archon i, 6) that of all spiritual creatures God alone has no body. Since then angels and demons are spiritual creatures, it would seem that they have bodies naturally united to them.
3. The imagination, and the irascible and concupiscent faculties are powers employing organs. Now these powers are in demons and likewise in angels: thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the wickedness of the devil is anger in the irascible, lust in the concupiscent and licence in the imagination. Therefore they have bodies naturally united to them.
4. Angels are either composed of matter and form or they are not. If they are, they must have bodies: because seeing that matter considered in itself is one. (since it is not differentiated save by a form) it follows that in all divers things composed of matter there must be divers forms received into divers parts of matter: for the same matter cannot receive divers forms. Now diversity of parts in matter is inconceivable without division of matter; likewise division without dimension, since without these substance is indivisible (Phys. i). Consequently all things composed of matter must be dimensioned and therefore bodies.—On the other hand if angels are not composed of matter and form, they are either self-subsistent forms or forms united to bodies. If they are self-subsistent forms, it follows

that they do not derive their being from another: because since the form as such is the principle of being, that which is a pure form has not its being from a cause, but is only a cause of being in other things. And if they are forms united to bodies, these bodies must be united to them naturally: because union of form with matter is natural. It remains then that we must needs admit one of these three, namely that angels are bodies, or are uncreated substances, or have bodies naturally united to them. But the first two are impossible. Therefore we must admit the third.

5. A form as such is that whereby something is informed. Wherefore a pure form informs without being in any way informed: and this belongs to God alone, who is the supreme beauty whence all things are beautiful, as Augustine says *De Civ. Dei* viii (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 23). Therefore angels are not pure forms, and consequently are forms united to bodies.

6. just as the soul is unable to produce an effect in external bodies, except by means of corporeal instruments, so neither can an angel without corporeal powers, which he uses as instruments. Now the soul for the purpose of its activities has a body naturally united to it. Therefore angels have also.

7. The first movement in bodies is that whereby a body is moved by an incorporeal substance. Now the first movement is of that which moves itself (*Phys. viii*) because that which is (so and so) of itself precedes that which is (so and so) through another. Therefore that which is moved immediately by an incorporeal substance is moved as being moved of itself. But this is impossible unless the incorporeal substance that causes movement be united to the body naturally. Since then angels and demons move bodies immediately (A. 2) it would seem that they have bodies naturally united to them.

8. It is better to live and give life than to live only, just as light is more perfectly in that which shines and enlightens than in that which shines only. Now the human soul lives and quickens the body naturally united to it. Therefore the angel lives not less perfectly than the soul.

9. The movement of a body that has various movements is the movement of a thing that moves itself: because that which has only one movement seemingly does not move itself (*Phys. viii*). Now the celestial body is moved with various movements. Thus the planets according to astronomers are said at times to move forwards, at other times backwards

and sometimes to be stationary. Therefore the movement of the higher bodies is of things which move themselves, so that they are composed of corporeal and of spiritual substance. But this spiritual substance is not a human soul, nor is it God. Therefore it is an angel: and consequently an angel has a body naturally united to him.

10. Nothing acts beyond its species. Now the heavenly bodies cause life in the world below, as instanced in animals engendered of putrid matter by the power of the celestial bodies. Since then a living substance excels one that is not living, as Augustine says (*De Vera Relig.* 29, 55) ~ it would seem that the heavenly bodies have life and thus have spiritual substances naturally united to them so that we come to the same conclusion as before.

11. The first movable thing is the heavenly body. Now the Philosopher proves (*Phys.* viii) that all moved things are reduced to the first movable that is moved of itself. Therefore the heaven is moved of itself: and thus it is composed of a body that is moved and an immovable mover which is a spiritual substance and so the same conclusion follows as before.

12. According to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* vii) divine wisdom has so ordained that the highest point of the lower nature is in contact with the lowest point of the higher nature. Now the highest point in corporeal nature is the heavenly body, since it transcends all other bodies. Therefore it is in contact with the spiritual nature and is united to it; and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

13. The body of the heavens is more excellent than the human body, even as the everlasting surpasses the corruptible. Now the human body is naturally united to a spiritual substance. Therefore a fortiori the heavenly body is, seeing that the more noble body has the more noble form: and thus we come to the same conclusion as before.

14. Certain animals are formed from the earth, for instance men and beasts; some from water, as fish and birds, according to *Genesis* i. Therefore there must be some formed from air, some from fire and some from celestial matter. Now the latter cannot be other than angels and demons, for seeing that these are the more noble bodies they must have the more noble souls. Therefore angels and demons are animals and have bodies naturally united to them

15. Plato also seems to favour this view: thus in the Timaeus he says that there are animals solid as the earth, others akin to liquid, others subtle as the air, others akin to the gods: and these must be the angels. Consequently the angel is an animal, and the same conclusion follows as before.

16. Nothing is moved except a body (Phys. vi). Now an angel is moved. Therefore he is either a body or naturally united to a body.

17. The Word of God is above the angels: and he is united to a body. Therefore it is not beneath the dignity of an angel to be united to a body naturally.

18. Porphyry says (Pradic., De Differentia) that the word mortal in the definition of a man distinguishes us from the gods, whereby only the angels can be meant. Therefore the angels are animals, and thus have bodies naturally united to them.

On the contrary, Damascene (De Fid. Orth. ii, 3) says that an angel is an intellectual substance, ever movable, free and incorporeal.

Again, it is stated in De Causis (prop. 7) that an intelligence is a simple substance: and the Commentator says (ibid.) that it is neither a magnitude nor spread over a magnitude. Now an angel is an intelligence, as is clearly indicated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) who calls the angels divine minds and intelligences. Therefore an angel is neither a body nor united to a body.

Again, angels and souls differ in the point of incapability and capability of union to a body: so that if an angel were united to a body, he would nowise differ from a soul; which cannot be admitted.

Again, there is a spiritual substance that is dependent on a body as regards its beginning and its end, for instance the vegetal and sensible soul: there is also a spiritual substance dependent on a body as regards its beginning and not as regards its end, to wit, the

human soul. Therefore there will be a spiritual substance that needs not a body, either as to its beginning or as to its end: and this can be no other but an angel or a demon. That there be one which needs a body as to its end and not as to its beginning, is impossible.

Again, there is a form, e.g. of a stone, that is neither a soul nor a spirit: and there is a form that is a soul but not a spirit, e.g. of a dumb animal: and there is a form that is both soul and spirit, e.g. the form of a man. Therefore there will be a form that is a spirit but not a soul: and such is an angel. Hence an angel is not united to a body naturally, since this enters into the definition of a soul.

I answer that the ancients were divided in opinion concerning incorporeal substances.

Some of the philosophers of old contended that there was no such thing as an incorporeal substance and that all substances are bodies: and Augustine (Confess.) confesses that at one time he fell into this error. This opinion, however, was refuted by the philosophers. Aristotle rejected it (Phys. viii) for this reason that there must be some infinite moving power, since otherwise it would not produce a perpetual movement. Again he proves that every power of a magnitude must be finite whence it follows that there must be a power that is wholly incorporeal, in order to produce a continual movement. Again he proves the same conclusion in another way (Metaph. xii). Act precedes potentiality both by nature and in time, absolutely speaking: although in this or that individual that passes from potentiality to act, potentiality precedes act in point of time. But seeing that it must be brought into actuality by something that is already actual, it follows that absolutely speaking act precedes potentiality even in time. Wherefore since every body is in potentiality, as its mutability shows, there must needs be an everlasting unchangeable substance that precedes all bodies. A third argument in support of the same conclusion may be taken from the principles of the Platonists. Finite and, individual being must needs be preceded by a being that is infinite: thus if we find fire having a finite and so to speak participated nature in iron, we must expect to find the nature of fire in something that is fire essentially. Hence seeing that being and all other perfections and forms are found to have a finite nature in that they are received into matter, we infer that there must pre-exist an incorporeal substance wherein there is the perfection of being not in a finite manner but with a certain universal fullness. The reason why they were led into the error of maintaining that all substance is corporeal was that their intelligence being unable to rise above their 'imagination whose object is wholly corporeal they were unable to reach the knowledge of incorporeal substances which the intelligence alone can grasp.

Others admitted the existence of incorporeal substances but they supposed them to be united to bodies, and they denied that any incorporeal substance could be found that is not the form of a body. Hence they contended that God himself is the world-soul: thus Augustine (De Civ. Dei iv, A states that Varro held God to be a soul that governs the world by movement and reason. Hence he said that the whole world is God on account of its soul and not by reason of its body, just as a man is said to be wise in respect of his soul, not of his body. For this reason heathens worshipped the whole world and its parts. This opinion also was refuted by the philosophers for several reasons. First because a power united to and informing a body has a restricted action through being united to a particular kind of body: wherefore since there must needs be a universal agent exercising its influence on all bodies, inasmuch as the first mover cannot be a body, as we have proved, it follows that there must be some incorporeal being that is not united to a body. Hence Anaxagoras posited a subsistent intellect, that it might be able to command (Phys. viii), because to command belongs to one who is above those who are commanded, and is neither subject nor bound to them in any way.—Secondly, because if every incorporeal substance be united to a body as the form thereof, it would follow that the first thing to be in motion moves itself like an animal, as being composed of a corporeal and a spiritual substance. Now that which moves itself does so by its will inasmuch as it is appetent of something: for the appetite is a moved mover, while the appetible object is a non-moved mover. Consequently above the incorporeal substance united to a body there must be something higher to move it as the appetible object moves the appetite: and this must be an intelligible good: since this is appetible as being good simply, whereas the appetible object of sense is sought, as being this particular good and at this particular moment.

Now an intelligible good must be incorporeal, since were it not devoid of matter it could not be an object of intelligence: wherefore it must needs be intelligent, seeing that a substance is intelligent through being free of matter. Therefore above the substance that is united to a body, there must be another higher substance that is incorporeal or intellectual and not united to a body. This is the proof given by Aristotle (Metaph. xi); for it cannot be said that a thing which sets itself in motion seeks nothing outside itself: since it would never be in motion, inasmuch as the purpose of motion is to obtain something. that is extrinsic in some way or other.—Thirdly, because that which sets itself in motion may be moved or not moved (Phys. viii), wherefore if something that is moved by itself be continually in motion, the continuance of its motion must needs be due to something outside that is wholly immovable. Now we observe that the heaven whose soul they held to be God is in continual motion: wherefore above the substance that animates the world—if there be such a substance—there must be a yet higher substance, that is not

united to a body, and is self-subsistent. Those who contended that every substance is united to a body were apparently led astray through thinking that matter is the cause of subsistence and individuality in all beings, as it is in corporeal beings: wherefore they thought that incorporeal substances cannot subsist outside a body: as suggested by way of objection in the Commentary on *De Causis*.

Accordingly Plato and Aristotle rejected these opinions and held that certain substances are incorporeal, some united to bodies, some not united to any body. Plato according to Macrobius (*Super Somn. Scip. i*) posited two separate substances, namely God the father of the whole universe and occupying the highest place: and beneath him the mind of God which he called the paternal intelligence containing the types or ideas of all things. He also held that many incorporeal substances are united to bodies: some united to heavenly bodies, and these the Platonists called gods; some united to air—like bodies, whom they called demons. Hence Augustine (*De Civ. Dei viii, 16*) quotes the following definition of the demons as given by Apuleius,: Demons are animals with a rational mind, a passive and immortal soul. Moreover, the heathens who adopted the ideas of Plato held that divine worship was to be given to an these incorporeal substances on account of their immortality. Further, they believed that incorporeal substances are united to the grosser terrestrial bodies, those namely that are akin to earth and water, to wit the souls of men and of other animals. Aristotle agrees with Plato on two points, and differs from him in two. He agrees with him in that he believes in a supreme substance neither corporeal nor united to a body, and in holding the heavenly bodies to be animate: but he differs from him by maintaining the existence of several incorporeal substances not united to a body, corresponding to the various heavenly movements: and again in denying the existence of air-like animals, and he did so with reason. First, because a mixed body is superior to an elemental body, especially as regards the form: since the elements are the matter of mixed bodies. Wherefore incorporeal substances which are the highest of all forms ought to be united to mixed bodies and not to the elements. Now there can be no mixed body in which there is not a preponderance of earth and water in point of the quantity of matter, since even the higher elements are more active through being more formal: and if these latter were to preponderate, the proportion due to a mixture would not be observed, seeing that the higher elements would altogether subdue the lower. Consequently it is not possible that incorporeal substances be united as forms to aerial bodies, but to mixed bodies in which the earthy and watery matter preponderates.—Secondly, because a homogeneous and uniform body must needs have the same form in the whole and in its parts. Now the body of the air is all of one nature: so that if any spiritual substances be united to any parts of the air, they must also be united to the whole: and thus the whole air will be animated, which seemingly is an absurd thing to say, although some of the ancients were of this opinion (*De Anima i*), holding that the air is full of gods. —Thirdly, because if a

spiritual substance has no other powers besides intellect and will, it were useless for it to be united to a body, since these operations are performed independently of the body: inasmuch as every form of a body executes some of its actions in dependence on the body. If however a spiritual substance has other powers (as apparently the Platonists held to be the case with the demons, for they said that these had a passive soul, and passions are only in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in *Phys.* viii), it needs to be united to an organic body, so as to be able to perform the actions of such powers by means of determinate organs. But an aerial body cannot satisfy this condition, since it is shapeless. It follows then that spiritual substances cannot be naturally united to aerial bodies. As to whether incorporeal substances be united as forms of heavenly bodies Augustine leaves the question unsolved (*Gen. ad lit.* ii), while Jerome would seem to assert it as a fact in his commentary on *Ecclesiastes* i, 6, The Spirit goeth forward surveying all places round about, as also Origen (*Peri Archon*, i, 7). Several modern writers consider this to be disproved by the fact that since according to Scripture the number of the blessed is composed exclusively of men and angels, these spiritual substances would not be reckoned either among human souls or among the angels who are incorporeal. However Augustine (*Enchir.* lviii) considers this also doubtful: "It is by no means certain whether the sun, moon and stars belong to the same company, namely of the angels: although some are of opinion that they are bodies of light without sense or intelligence. Yet without any doubt whatever the teaching of both Plato and Aristotle differs from the doctrine of faith inasmuch as we hold that there are many substances not united to bodies, many more indeed than any of these admit." And this would seem the more probable view, for three reasons. First, because as the bodies above are of higher rank than those below, even so incorporeal substances rank higher than bodies: and the bodies above excel those below, inasmuch as the earth compared to the heavens is as a point in comparison with a sphere, as proved by astronomers. Hence incorporeal substances according to Dionysius (*Coel. Hier.* xiv.) surpass the entire multitude of material species; and this is indicated (*Dan.* vii, 10): Thousands of thousands ministered to him and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him. Moreover it is in keeping with the outpouring of the divine goodness that it should bring into existence in greater profusion those things that are the noblest in nature. And seeing that the higher things do not depend on the lower, nor are their powers confined to the things here below, we must not limit their activities to the phenomena of the lower world.—Secondly, because in the order of natural things, we find many degrees intervening between natures that are distant from each other: thus between animals and plants, there are imperfect animals which are like plants, in being fixtures, and are like animals in having sensation. Since then the supreme substance which is God is farthest removed from corporeal nature, it seems reasonable that there should be many intervening degrees of nature, and not only those substances which are principles of movement.—Thirdly, because since God exercises not only a universal providence over corporeal beings, but also a particular providence over individuals, in which as stated

above (A. i) at times he works independently of the order of universal causes: we must posit the existence not only of incorporeal substances who serve God in administering the universal causes of nature, namely the movements of heavenly bodies, but also of others who administer to God's particular works in individuals, especially as regards man whose mind is not subject to the heavenly movements. Accordingly following the truth of faith we assert that angels and demons have not bodies naturally united to them, but are wholly incorporeal as Dionysius says.

Reply to the First Objection. In several passages of his works Augustine makes use of the Platonic view about angels and demons having bodies, without actually agreeing with it. Hence (De Civ. Dei xxi, 10) treating of the punishment of the demons he follows up both the opinion of those who said that demons have aerial bodies, and the view of those who say that they are wholly incorporeal. Gregory describes an angel as being an animal, in the 'broad sense of the term, namely as indicating any animate being.

Reply to the Second Objection. On many points Origen adopts the views of the Platonists: thus he seems to have been of the opinion that all created incorporeal substances are united to bodies: and yet he does not state this positively, but suggests it as by no means certain, and at the same time mentions the other view.

Reply to the Third Objection. Without doubt Dionysius maintained that angels and demons are incorporeal. He employs the terms anger and concupiscence metaphorically for an inordinate will, and imagination as signifying the erring choice of their intelligence, inasmuch as "every wrongdoer is ignorant" according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, i) and they err who work evil (Prov. xiv).

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Even if angels be composed of matter and form, this argument does not prove that they are bodies; unless we suppose that angels and bodies have the same matter. It might be said indeed that the matter of bodies is distinct not by dimensional division but by relation to forms of different kinds, since potentiality is proportionate to act. But we would rather believe that angels are not composed of matter and form, but are pure self-subsistent forms. Nor does it follow from this that they were not created, because a form is a principle of existence, as that whereby a particular thing is, although the existence both of form and of matter in the composite proceeds from the one agent. Hence if there be a created substance that is a pure form it can have an efficient but not a formal principle.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii) there is an order of precedence even in formal causes: so that nothing prevents a form resulting from the participation of another form: and thus God who is pure being, is in a fashion the species of all subsistent forms that participate of being but are not their own being.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. In the natural order an angel's power is higher and therefore more universal than the power of a human soul: wherefore it could not have a corporeal organ that would adequately correspond to the action which it exercises on eternal bodies: and consequently it was not fitting for it to be bound to certain corporeal organs, as the soul is by union with the body.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The first thing moved is that which moves itself by reason of the immovable mover: hence if the immovable mover moves either a body naturally united to it, or one that is not so united, the relation of priority remains the same.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The soul united to the body quickens the body not only effectively but also formally: and absolutely speaking to quicken the body thus is less than to be self-quicken only. Because the soul is able to quicken the body inasmuch as it has the lowest degree of being which can be common to the soul and body when united together: whereas the being of an angel is higher in degree, and therefore cannot be thus communicated to a body: wherefore it lives only and does not quicken formally.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. That the planets seem to have a backward and forward movement and sometimes to be stationary is not due to a variable movement of one and the same movable, but to the various movements of different moveables, whether we put it down to eccentrics and epicycles according to Ptolemy, or to a difference of movements in the poles, as others maintain. And yet even if the heavenly bodies vary in their movements this does not prove that their movement is caused by a voluntary mover that is united rather than separated from them.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Even if the heavenly bodies be inanimate, they are moved by a living separate substance by whose power they act, even as an instrument by the power of the principal agent, and thus they cause life in things below them.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The Philosopher brings his arguments to two alternative conclusions, namely that all things moved must be reduced either directly to an immovable mover, or to a self-mover, part of which is an immovable mover: although he seems to prefer the latter alternative. If, however, anyone give preference to the former, nothing unreasonable is implicated in (the Philosopher's) arguments.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. That which is highest in bodies reaches the lowest degree of the spiritual nature by participating of its properties, for instance by being incorruptible, but not by being united to it.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The human body is inferior to the heavenly body as regards matter: yet it has a more noble form, if heavenly bodies are inanimate:—more noble, that is, in itself, but not as informing the body because the form of heaven perfects its matter in a more excellent way, by making it incorruptible, than the rational soul perfects the body. The reason is because the spiritual substance that moves heaven is of too high a dignity to be united to a body.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Bodies cannot be aerial for reasons already given. And this suffices for the Reply to the Fifteenth Objection which proceeds on the lines of Plato's opinion.,

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. An angel's movements are not by commensuration of the angel with space, like the movements of a body: and the term is used equivocally when we speak of the movements of angels and of bodies.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. The Word of God is not united to a body as informing it: for in that case the Word and the flesh would become one nature: and this is heretical.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. Porphyry follows the opinion of Plato when he gives the name of gods to the demons whom he held to be animals as well as the heavenly bodies.

## Q. VI: ARTICLE VII

### Can Angels Or Demons Assume Bodies?

THE seventh point of inquiry is whether angels or demons can assume bodies: and it would seem that they cannot.

1. A body cannot be united to an incorporeal substance except either in being or in movement. Now angels cannot have bodies united to them in being, because they would then be naturally united to them, which is contrary to what has been said (A. 6). Hence it follows that they cannot be united to bodies except as moving them. But this does not amount to assumption: since then angels and demons would assume every body that they move, which is clearly false: for an angel moved the tongue of Balaam's ass, and yet we do not say that he assumed it. Therefore we cannot say that angels or demons assume bodies.
2. If angels or demons assume bodies, this is not because they need to, but either for our instruction (as regards the good angels) or for our deception (as regards the wicked angels). But in either case an imaginary vision would be enough. Therefore seemingly they do not assume bodies.
3. God appeared to the Patriarchs in the Old Testament, even as angels are stated to have done, as Augustine proves (De Trin. iii, 11, 12). Now we must not say that God assumed a body, except in the mystery of the Incarnation. Therefore neither do angels assume bodies when they appear.
4. just as it naturally becomes the soul to be united to a body, so is it naturally becoming to an angel not to be united to a body. Now the soul cannot leave the body at will. Therefore neither can an angel assume a body.
5. No finite substance can perform several operations at the same time. Now an angel is a finite substance. Therefore he cannot at the same time administer to us and assume a body.

6. There should be proportion between assumed and assumer. But there is no proportion between an angel and a body, since they belong to wholly different genera and are therefore incompatible with each other. Therefore an angel cannot assume a body.

7. If an angel assume a body, this will either be a heavenly body or one with the nature of the four elements. But it cannot be a heavenly body, since the body of the heavens cannot be divided, or forced out of its place. Nor can it be an igneous body, for then he would consume the other bodies with which he came into contact: nor an aerial body, since air is shapeless: nor an aqueous body, for water does not retain shape: nor an earthly body, since they disappear suddenly, like the angel who appeared to Tobias. Therefore they do not assume any kind of body.

8. Every assumption terminates in some kind of union. But none of the three kinds of unity mentioned by the Philosopher (Phys. i) can result from an angel and a body: thus they cannot be one by continuity, nor by indivisibility, nor logically. Therefore an angel cannot assume a body.

9. If angels assume bodies, the bodies assumed by them either really are or are not as they appear to be. If they really are, since sometimes they appear as men, the body assumed by them will be a real human body: which is impossible, unless we say that an angel assumed a man, which would seem to be improbable. And if they are not, this again is seemingly unfitting, since pretense is unbecoming to the angels of truth. Therefore in no way does an angel assume a body.

10. As stated above (AA. 3, 4, 5) angels and demons cannot produce effects in the bodies of the lower world except by means of natural forces. Now the forces of nature are not implanted in bodies for the purpose of forming the human body otherwise than by the special process of generation, and from a special seed: and it is plain that angels do not assume a body in this way. And the same argument applies to the other bodily shapes in which angels appear at times. Therefore this cannot result from their assuming bodies.

11. In order to put a body in motion the mover must influence the body moved. But it cannot do this without some kind of contact: and seeing that an angel cannot be in

contact with a body, it would seem that he cannot move a body, nor consequently assume one.

12. Someone will reply to this that angels by their command move bodies with local movement.—On the contrary “Mover and moved must be together” (Phys. viii). But from the fact that an angel commands something by his will it does not follow that he is together with the body that is said to be moved by him. Therefore he cannot command it by his mere will.

13. As stated above (AA. 3, 4, 5) a body’s movement does not obey the mere will of an angel as regards its information. Now shape is a kind of form. Therefore by his mere command an angel cannot shape a body so that it have the appearance of a man, or of something of the kind wherein he may appear.

14. The (interlinear) gloss on Ps. x, 5), the Lord is in his holy temple, says that although the demons. exercise an external power over idols they cannot reside in them, nor consequently in other bodies. But if they assume bodies they must be in the bodies assumed. Therefore we must not say that they assume bodies.

15. If they assume bodies, they are united either to the whole body or to part of it. If they are united to a part only, they will be unable to move the whole body, unless they move one part by means of another: and this would seem to be impossible, unless the assumed body has organs appointed for movement, and this is peculiar to animate bodies. And if he be united immediately to the whole body, the angel must needs be in each part of the body assumed, and of course, wholly in each part, since he is indivisible. Hence he will be in several places at the same time, which belongs to God alone. Therefore an angel cannot assume a body.

On the contrary it is related (Gen. xviii, 2) that the angels who appeared to Abraham came to him in assumed bodies: and the same is said of the angel who appeared to Tobias.

I answer that, some of those who believe the statements of Scripture about angelic apparitions, say that an angel never assumes a body: thus Rabbi Moses who holds this view, says that all the apparitions of angels related in the Scriptures, are prophetic, i.e.

imaginary visions, the seer being either awake or asleep. But this does not safeguard the truth of Scripture: because the very expressions used by Scripture indicate what things are genuine facts and what are prophetic visions. Thus when we are to understand an apparition to be a mere vision, it employs words denoting a vision; for example (Ezech. viii, 3): The spirit lifted me up between the earth and the heaven and brought me in the vision of God in Jerusalem. Wherefore it is clear that when a thing is simply stated as a fact, we are to take it as such: and this applies to many apparitions in the Old Testament. We must admit then without any qualification that the angels do sometimes assume a body, by fashioning a sensible body, and offering it to external or corporeal vision: even as at other times by producing forms in the imagination they cause themselves to appear in imaginary visions. This is fitting for three reasons. First and chiefly, because all the apparitions of the Old Testament were ordered to that apparition whereby the Son of God appeared visibly on the earth, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 11, 12). Wherefore since the Son of God took to himself a real body, and not an imaginary one as the Manicheans pretended, it was fitting that the angels also should appear to men by assuming real bodies.—A second reason may be gathered from the words of Dionysius in his letter to Titus. Thus he says there that among other reasons why in the divine Scriptures divine things are made known to us under sensible signs, there is this—that the whole man may be perfected by participating as far as possible in divine things, by grasping the intelligible truth not only by his intellect, but also by perceiving it in sensible nature by means of sensible forms which are images as it were of divine things. Hence in like manner seeing that angels appear to man in order to perfect him, it is fitting that they not only enlighten his intelligence by intellectual vision, but also that they profit his imagination and exterior senses by imaginary visions, namely of the bodies they assume. Wherefore this threefold vision is mentioned by Augustine (Gen. ad lit, xi, 7, 24).—A third reason may be that although the angels are by nature above us, it is possible for us by grace to attain to equality and fellowship with them—They will be as the angels in heaven (Mt. xxii, 30). Hence in order to give proof of their companionability and kinship in our regard, they conform to us, in so far as it becomes them, by assuming a body: and thus by assuming what is ours, they enable our minds to rise to what is peculiar to them: even so the Son of God by descending to us, raised us to things divine.—As to the demons, when they transform themselves into angels of light, they endeavour to deceive us by, doing what the good angels do for our profit.

Reply to the First Objection. An angel does not assume every body that he moves. To assume is to take to oneself (ad se sumere). Accordingly an angel assumes a body, not that he may unite it to his nature as a man takes food: nor to unite it to his person, as the Son of God took human nature; but in order to represent himself, in the same way as intelligible things can be represented by sensible objects. Thus an angel is said to assume a

body when he fashions himself a body in such a way that it is adapted to represent him, as Dionysius explains by saying that the bodily shapes signify the angelic properties (Coel. Hier. v).

Reply to the Second Objection. As already stated not only imaginary but also corporeal vision is useful for our instruction.

Reply to the Third Objection. As Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 11, 12) all the apparitions of God related in the Old Testament were effected by the ministry of the angels, who fashion certain forms imaginary or corporeal, whereby they lead the seer's mind to God; even as it is possible to lead man to God by sensible signs. Accordingly in these apparitions the angels assumed the bodies that appeared: yet God is said to have appeared in them, because he was the end whereto the angels intended to raise man's mind by means of these representations. Hence in these apparitions Scripture sometimes states that God appeared and sometimes an angel.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Nothing has a power that surpasses its being, since everything's power rises from its essence or presupposes it. And since the soul is united by its being to the body as the form thereof, it is not in its power to release itself from union with the body: and in like manner it is not in the angel's power to unite himself in his being to a body as its form: but he can assume a body in the manner indicated above, to which body he is united as its mover, and as a figure to its shape.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. These two operations, the assumption of a body and ministering to us are ordered the one to the other: so that there is nothing to prevent both being done at the same time.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Between an angel and a body there cannot be proportion of commensuration, since their respective magnitudes are not in the same genus and are altogether disparate. But nothing prevents an angel from having a certain relationship to a body such as that of a mover to the thing moved, or of a figure to its shape; and this may be called proportion.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. An angel can assume a body from any element, as well as from several elements mixed together. It is, however, more fitting that he assume a body from the air, which condenses easily so as to take and retain shape and reflect various colours from other bodies, as may be seen in the clouds: so that as far as the present question is concerned there is no difference between pure air and steam or smoke which tend to the nature of air.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The division referred to is that of simple unity: the union of an angel with a body does not produce unity of this kind but a relative unity, such as that of the mover and thing moved, or figure and shape, as stated above.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. The appearances of the body assumed by an angel are real as regards what is perceptible to the senses, as this is the *per se* sensible, for example colour and shape, but not as regards the specific nature which is accidentally sensible. Nor does this implicate any pretence on the part of the angel, since he does not present himself to human eyes under the guise of a man in order to be taken for a man, but that angelic virtues may be indicated by means of human characteristics: thus neither are metaphors false whereby certain things, are signified by their likeness to others.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although the natural forces of bodies do not suffice to produce the real species of a human body except by the way of generation, they suffice to produce a resemblance to a human body as regards colour, shape and like external accidents. This would seem to apply particularly to certain of these accidents which can be produced by the local movement of certain bodies, whereby vapours are condensed or rarefied, and clouds given various shapes.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. An angel in moving a body induces the movement therein, and touches it not by corporeal but by spiritual or virtual contact.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. A (body's) power must needs execute the angel's behest, so that he must be in virtual contact with the body that he moves.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Shape is a form that can be produced in matter by cutting, condensing, vaporising or fashioning, or some like kind of movement: wherefore the same does not apply to this kind of forms as to others.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. We may understand something as being in a body in two ways. First as contained within the dimensions of the body: and in this way nothing prevents a demon from being in a body. Secondly as present in the essence of a thing by giving it being and operating therein: this belongs to God alone, although he is not an essential part of anything. Moreover the sense of the gloss is that the demons were not in idols as idolaters imagined them to be, namely so that the idol and the indwelling spirit were one being.

I Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. An angel in the same way as the soul is wholly in each part of the assumed body: for though he is not, as the soul is, the form of that body he is its mover: and mover and moved must be together. Yet it does not follow that he is in several places at the same time, because the whole assumed body in relation to the angel is as one place.

#### Q. VI: ARTICLE VIII

Can An Angel Or Demon by Means of An Assumed Body Exercise the Functions of A Living Body?

THE eighth point of inquiry is whether an angel or demon by means of an assumed body can exercise the functions of a living body: and seemingly he cannot.

1. Whoever is competent to have the power to exercise a certain function, is competent to have anything that is required for the exercise of that function, else the power would be useless to him. Now the functions of living bodies cannot be exercised without bodily organs. Since then an angel has no bodily organs naturally united to him, it would seem that he cannot exercise these functions.

2. The soul excels nature. But an angel cannot make nature act except by means of natural forces. Much less therefore can he produce the functions of the soul in an inanimate body.

3. Of all the operations of the soul that are exercised through organs, those of the senses are more akin to intellectual operation which is proper to an angel. But an angel cannot feel or imagine through an assumed body. Much less then can he exercise the other functions of the soul.

4. Without a voice there can be no speech: and voice is sound emitted from an animal's mouth. Since then the angel who uses an assumed body is not an animal, seemingly he cannot use it to speak; much less for other actions, seeing that speech being a sip of intelligence is apparently most akin to him.

5. In one and the same individual the ultimate operation of the vegetal soul is generation: for an animal feeds and grows before generating. Now it cannot be said that an angel, or a body assumed by him, feeds or grows. Therefore an assumed body cannot generate.

6. Someone will reply that an angel or demon can generate through an assumed body, not by means of seed from that body, but by conveying seed from a man to a woman: even as he produces certain real natural effects by employing appropriate seeds.—On the contrary, animal seed is effective chiefly by natural heat: and if a demon were to transport seed from a distance, it would seem impossible to prevent the natural heat from evaporating. Therefore a man cannot be generated in this way.

7. If this were possible, from such seed a man would be generated in proportion to the power of human seed. Hence those who are stated to have been begotten by demons would not be of higher stature and greater strength than others who are generated in the usual way from human seed. Whereas it is stated (Gen. vi, 4): After the Sons of God went into the daughters of men, and they brought forth children (giants were born) these are the mighty men of old, men of renown.

8. Food is taken by eating: so that if angels do not feed in their assumed bodies, seemingly neither do they eat.

9. To show the reality of his risen human body, Christ after his resurrection willed to eat. Now this would have been no proof of his resurrection if angels or demons in their assumed bodies were able to eat: and it certainly was a proof. Therefore angels or demons cannot eat through their assumed bodies.

1. On the contrary it is said of the angels who appeared to Abraham (Gen. xviii, 9): When they had eaten, they said to him: Where is Sara th wife? Therefore angels both eat and speak in their assumed bodies.

2. Commenting on Gen. vi, 2, The sons of God etc. Jerome says: "The Hebrew word , has either a singular or a plural signification: for it means both God and gods. Hence Aquila dared to say that the sons of gods are gods, thereby meaning saints or angels." Therefore apparently the angels generate.

3. Just as nothing is without purpose in human art, so neither is there in the art of the angels. Now there would be no purpose in their assuming bodies disposed as organic bodies, unless they used the organs. Therefore seemingly in their assumed bodies they exercise functions corresponding to the various organs: for instance, they see with the eyes, hear with the ears and so forth.

I answer that an action takes its species from two sources, the agent, and its term: thus heating differs from cooling in that the former proceeds from heat and terminates in heat, while the latter proceeds from cold and terminates in cold. Properly speaking action like movement takes its species from its term; whereas it takes its naturality from its source. For movement and action are said to be natural when they proceed from an intrinsic source. We must note then that some of the functions of the soul not only proceed from the soul as their source, but also terminate in the soul and the animate body. Such like actions cannot be ascribed to angels in their assumed bodies; for they are neither of the same species (as when performed by us) nor are they natural to the angel: for instance, sensation, growth, nourishment and the like. For sensation follows a movement from things to the soul; likewise nourishment and growth consist in generating something that is added to the living body. On the other hand some actions of the soul have the soul as their source, but terminate in an external effect: and if this effect can be produced by mere bodily division or local movement, it may be said that the angel in his assumed body

performs such an action, as regards a specific likeness in the effect: but the action will not be truly natural, but like a natural action: thus speech is produced by movement of the organs and air, and eating, by division of food and its transmission throughout the body. Hence speech when ascribed to angels in assumed bodies is not really natural speech but an imitation thereof by producing a like effect: and the same applies to eating. Wherefore it is written (Tob. xii, 18, 19): When I was with you... I seemed indeed to eat and to drink with you; but I use an invisible meat and drink. If, however, the effect requires to be the result of a transformation, it cannot be produced by an angel: except perhaps by means of a natural action, as in the case of generation.

Reply to the First Objection. An angel does not perform these actions naturally, wherefore he needs not to have the corresponding organs naturally united to him.

Reply to the Second Objection. As stated above, an angel does not perform real operations of the soul but imitations of them.

Reply to the Third Objection. We have said (in the body of the Article) why sensation cannot be ascribed to angels in assumed bodies.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. As stated above, an angel's speech in an assumed body is not real but an imitation of speech.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Generation is never ascribed to good angels: concerning the demons, however, there are two opinions. Some say that even the demons are unable to generate in their assumed bodies, and this for the reasons given in the objections. Others, however, are of opinion that they can, not indeed by seed from the body assumed, or by virtue of their own nature, but by employing the seed of a man for the purpose of generation, one and the same demon being succubus to a man and transferring the seed thus received by acting as incubus to a woman. This may be reasonably held, since demons cause also other natural things by using appropriate seeds, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8, 9).

Reply to the Sixth Objection. A demon is able to remedy the evaporation of the semen, both by rapidity of movement, or by employing such means as will retain the natural heat in the semen.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Without doubt a generation that is effected in the way mentioned is the result of the force in the human seed. Wherefore a man begotten in this way is the child not of the demon but of the man whose seed was employed. And yet it is possible that stronger and bigger men be begotten in this way; because the demons who seek to be admired for their feats, can observe the position of the stars, and the respective temperaments of the man and woman so as to produce such an effect: and especially if the seed through being used by them as instrument receive thereby an increase of power.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Eating is ascribed to angels in assumed bodies, not for the purpose of growth, but as the mere act of eating: likewise it is ascribed to Christ after whose resurrection no addition could be made to his body. There is this difference however, that in Christ's case eating was real, since he had a vegetal soul, and so there could be an increase in the truth of his nature. But in neither case was the food changed into flesh and blood, but was resolved into prejacent matter.

This suffices for the Reply to the Ninth Objection.

Solution of the first argument in the contrary sense. We have explained in the body of the Article in what sense eating and speaking are to be ascribed to an angel.

Solution of the second argument. The sons of God denote the sons of Seth, who were sons of God by grace, and of the angels by imitation. The sons of men are the sons of Cain, who abandoned God and lived according to the flesh.

Solution of the third argument. The angels assume the organs of sense, not to use them, but as signs: hence although they do not sense by them, they do not assume them to no purpose.

Q. VI: ARTICLE IX

## Should the Working of A Miracle Be Attributed to Faith?

[ Sum. Th. II-II, Q. clxxviii, AA. 1, 2.]

THE ninth point of inquiry is whether the working of a miracle should be ascribed to faith: and seemingly it should not.

1. The gratuitous graces differ from the virtues, in that the virtues are common to all holy persons, whereas the gratuitous graces are divided among various persons, according to 1 Corinthians xii, 4: There are diversities of graces. Now the working of miracles belongs to a gratuitous grace, wherefore it is said (*ibid.* 10.): To another the working of miracles. Therefore the working of miracles is not, to be put down to faith.
2. It will be replied that it is ascribed to faith as the meritorious cause, and to the gratuitous grace as the executive cause.—On the contrary a gloss says: "Sometimes Prophecy, the working of miracles, the casting out of devils is not due to the merit of the worker but to the invocation of Christ's name." Therefore seemingly it is not to be ascribed to faith.
3. Charity is the source and root of merit, and without it formless faith cannot merit. Hence if the working of miracles be put down to faith by reason of merit, it should be ascribed still more to charity.
4. Since holy men work miracles by praying, the working of miracles should be ascribed chiefly to that virtue which causes prayers to be heard: and this is charity. Thus it is said, (*Mt.* xviii, 19): If two of you shall consent upon earth concerning anything whatsoever they shall ask it shall be done to them by my Father who is in heaven: and (*Ps.* xxxvi, 4): Delight in the Lord and he will give thee the requests of thy heart. For it is charity that makes man delight in the Lord through love of God, and consent with his fellow men through love of his neighbour. Therefore the working of miracles should be set down to charity.

5. It is said (Jo. ix, 31): We know that God doth not hear sinners. Now charity alone removes sins, for as it is written (Prov. x, 12) charity covereth all sins. Therefore the working of miracles should be attributed to charity and not to faith.

6. Holy men work miracles not only by impetration but also authoritatively, as Gregory says (Dial. ii, 30): and this is due to man's union with God, so that the divine power comes to his aid. Now charity causes this union, for he who is joined to the Lord, i.e. by charity, is one spirit (1 Cor. vi, 17). Therefore the working of miracles is to be ascribed to charity.

7. Envy is especially opposed to charity, since charity rejoices in the good things for which envy grieves. Now according to a gloss on Gal. iii, i, envy by bewitching men produces an evil effect in them. Therefore the working of miracles is to be put down to charity.

8. The intellect is not a principle of action except through the medium of the will. Now faith is in the intellect, and charity is in the will. Therefore neither does faith work save through charity: Faith that worketh by charity (Gal. v. 6). Therefore just as virtuous deeds are ascribed to charity rather than to faith, so also is the working of miracles.

9. At other miracles are directed to the Incarnation of Christ which is the miracle of miracles. Now the Incarnation is ascribed to charity (Jo. iii, 16): God so loved the world, as to give his only begotten Son. Therefore other miracles are to be ascribed not to faith but to charity.

10. It was a miracle that Sara old and barren bore a son to an old man: and this is ascribed to hope (Rom. iv, 18): Who against hope believed in hope. Therefore the working of miracles is to be ascribed to hope and not to faith.

11. A miracle is something difficult and unusual as Augustine says (Tract. viii in Joan: De Trin. iii, 5). Now difficult things are the object of hope. Therefore the working of miracles should be attributed to hope.

12. A miracle is a sign of the divine power. Now just as charity corresponds to goodness which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, and as faith corresponds to truth which is

appropriated to the Son: even so hope corresponds to power which is appropriated to the Father. Therefore the working of miracles should be ascribed to hope.

13. Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu, 79) that wicked men sometimes work miracles by outward signs of righteousness. Therefore the working of miracles is to be set down to righteousness, and not to faith.

14. It is stated (Acts vi, 8) that Stephen full of grace and fortitude did great wonders and signs among the people. Therefore seemingly it should be ascribed to fortitude.

15. Our Lord said to his disciples (Mt. xvii, 20) when they were unable to cast out devils: This kind is not cast out but by Prayer and fasting. Now the casting out of devils is reckoned among miracles: and fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence. Therefore the working of miracles belongs to abstinence.

16. Bernard says that to be constantly with women without falling is more than to raise the dead. Now that belongs to chastity. Therefore it belongs to chastity to work miracles, and not to faith.

17. That which is derogatory to faith should not be ascribed to faith. Now miracles are derogatory to faith since unbelievers ascribe them to the magic acts. Therefore miracles should not be set down to faith.

18. The faith of Peter and Andrew is commended by Gregory (Hom. v. in Evang.) for that they believed without seeing miracles. Therefore miracles are derogatory to faith and the same conclusion follows as before.

19. Given the cause the effect follows. If then faith be the cause of miracles being wrought, all who believe would work miracles: and this is clearly false. Therefore it does not belong to faith to work miracles.

On the contrary it is said (Mk. xvi, 17): These signs shall follow them that believe. In my name they shall cast out devils, etc.

Again our Lord said (Mt. xvii, 19): If you have faith as a grain of mustard-seed you shall say to this mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove: and nothing shall be impossible to you.

Again, if A which is the opposite of B causes C which is the opposite of D, then B is the cause of D. Now unbelief is a cause which hinders the working of miracles: thus it is said (Mk. vi, 5, 6) of Christ: He could not do any miracles there (i.e. in his own city) only that he cured a few that were sick, laying his hands upon them, and he wondered because of their unbelief, and (Mt. xvii, 18) it is related that when the disciples asked our Lord: Why could not we cast him out? Because of your unbelief, said he. Therefore faith is the cause of the working of miracles. I answer that holy men work miracles in two ways, according to Gregory (Dial. ii, 30) namely by impetration and authoritatively. Now in both ways faith renders a man fit to work miracles. For faith makes a man deserve that a miracle be wrought in answer to his prayer: and this is clear for the following reason. It is to be observed that whereas in natural things all particular causes derive the effectiveness of their action from the universal cause, a particular and proper effect is ascribed to a particular cause. We have an example of this in the active forces of the lower bodies in relation to the power of the heavenly body; and in the lower spheres which while following the movement of the first sphere, have each one their proper movements: and it is the same with the virtues whereby we merit. For they all derive their efficacy in meriting from charity, which unites us to God from whom we merit, and perfects our will whereby we merit, and yet each virtue merits a certain particular reward proportionately corresponding to it: thus humility merits exaltation, and poverty merits the kingdom. Hence sometimes when a man has lost charity, although he merits nothing condignly by acts of other virtues, yet through the divine liberality he may be repaid for these acts by certain congruous benefits, at any rate in this life. Wherefore it is said that a man may sometimes congruously merit an increase of worldly goods by deeds generically good which he has done while deprived of charity. In this way then faith merits the working of miracles, although the root of the merit is charity.

Three reasons may be given for this. First, because miracles are arguments of faith, inasmuch as when something is done above the faculty of nature, it provides a proof of that which surpasses the natural faculty of reason: hence it is said (Mk. xvi, 20) : They going

forth preached everywhere: the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed.

The second reason is because faith is based chiefly on the divine power, which it conceives as being the motive or medium of assent to things which appear to be above reason: wherefore the divine power in miraculous works comes especially to the assistance of faith.

The third reason is because miracles are wrought independently of natural causes: and faith takes its arguments not from reasons pertaining to nature and the senses but from things pertaining to God.

Hence just as poverty in worldly goods merits spiritual riches, and humility merits heavenly exaltation, even so faith through despising as it were things done naturally, merits after a. fashion the working of miracles which are wrought above the faculty of nature.

In like manner faith makes a man suitable to work a miracle authoritatively. Three reasons will make this clear. First, because as already stated (A. 4) holy men are said to work miracles authoritatively, not as though they were the chief authors of miracles, but because as divine instruments they announce, as it were, to natural things the divine command which nature obeys when miracles are wrought. Now it is by faith that God's words dwell in us, because faith is a kind of participation in God's truth: wherefore faith disposes a man to the working of miracles.

Secondly, because holy men who work miracles authoritatively, act by the power of God working in nature. For God's action is compared to the whole of nature, as the soul's action to the body: and the body is transmuted by the soul above the order of natural principles, especially by a persistent imagination whereby the body is heated whether through desire or through anger, or is even constitutionally changed so as to become feverish or leprous. Accordingly a man will be disposed to the working of miracles by that which gives persistence and stability to his apprehension. And a firm faith does this: and therefore firmness of faith conduces in no small measure to the working of miracles. This is made evident (Mt. xxi, 21) where it is said: If you shall have faith and stagger not, not only this of the fig-tree shall you do, but also if you shall say to this mountain, Take up and cast thyself into the sea, it shall be done: and (Jas. i, 6), Let him ask in faith nothing wavering.

Thirdly, because miracles wrought authoritatively are done by way of command, and therefore a man is especially fitted to work miracles authoritatively by that which fits him to command: and this is a certain aloofness and withdrawal from those whom he has to command. Thus Anaxagoras says that the intellect is not mixed with the body, so that it may govern it. Now faith withdraws the mind from the domain of nature and sense, and sets it on the foundation of things intelligible. Consequently faith renders a man fit to work miracles authoritatively. For this reason those virtues are most conducive to the working of miracles, which withdraw a man's mind from those things which are most material: such as continence and abstinence which withdraw man from the preference of those things which engage his mind in sensible things. But other virtues which direct man in the administration of temporal things, do not so dispose him to the working of miracles.

Reply to the First Objection. The working of miracles is ascribed to the gratuitous grace as its proximate principle, and to faith as a disposition to the gratuitous grace.

Reply to the Second Objection. Though sometimes a sinner works a miracle, this is not due to his merit—that is, not to his condign merit—but to a certain congruity, inasmuch as he holds constantly to the faith in witness whereof God works the miracle.

Reply to the Third Objection. Charity through being a greater virtue than faith makes faith meritorious: yet faith more congruously merits in a special way the working of miracles. For faith is a perfection of the intellect, whose act consists in the thing understood being, after a fashion, in the intellect: whereas charity is a perfection of the will, whose act consists in its tending to the thing in itself. Wherefore by charity man abides in God and becomes one with him: whereas by faith divine things abide in us: for which reason it is said (Heb. xi, i) that faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.—Moreover miracles are wrought in confirmation of faith, and not of charity.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. As stated, charity merits the granting of prayers, as the universal source of merit: but faith merits in a special way the working of miracles, as we have said above (Reply Obj. 3).

Reply to the Fifth Objection. According to a gloss on this passage, these are the words of the blind man, who had not yet fully received the sight of wisdom: wherefore they contain an untruth. God does at times hear sinners; but this is owing to his liberality and not to their merits: so that their prayer is impetratory but not meritorious; even as sometimes the prayer of a just man is meritorious but not impetratory: for impetration regards the object of the petition and is wholly gratuitous, whereas merit regards the merited reward and is a matter of justice.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. As we have already said (Reply Obj. 3) charity unites man to God as drawing man to God: but faith draws divine things to us.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Envy could not have an evil effect by bewitching men, unless a fixed imagination conduced to that effect.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. This argument proves that faith merits through charity, and this has been granted (Reply Obj. 3). Moreover the objection holds in those actions which a man does by his own power, and wherein the intellect directs the will that commands the executive power. But in those actions where the divine power is executive, faith alone which is based on the divine power suffices for action.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. This argument considers the miracle as wrought by God whose every action in creatures is motived by love. Thus God's love did not permit him to be barren as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But we are considering the miracle as done by man: wherefore the objection is not to the point.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The working of miracles is not properly ascribed to hope: because the object of hope is a thing to be obtained, wherefore it is only about eternal things. But faith is of things both eternal and temporal: and thus it can extend to things that have to be done. For this reason in the words quoted the chief place is given to hope rather than to faith: He believed in hope.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The object of hope is something difficult to obtain, not difficult to do.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. God's power corresponds to hope, inasmuch as he is above all in majesty; and the possession of this is the object of hope. But the power itself as effective of miracles is the base on which faith is founded chiefly.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Outward signs of righteousness come from that faith whereby the whole Church is justified, according to Rom. iii, 22, The justice of God through faith in Christ Jesus.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The martyrs showed fortitude in suffering and constancy in confessing on account the firmness of their faith.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Abstinence also conduces to the working of miracles, but not in the same degree as faith.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Though it be difficult to be constantly with women and not to fall, it is not a miracle properly speaking, since it depends on a created power, namely the free-will.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. The abuse of miracles by those who spoke ill of them does not detract from their efficacy in confirming the faith of those who were well disposed.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. The faith of Peter and Andrew is commended on account of their readiness to believe: and this was all the more enhanced as they needed fewer reasons for believing; and miracles by their very nature are to be reckoned among these reasons.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Faith is not a sufficient cause of working miracles, but a disposition thereto. And miracles are wrought according to the ordering of divine providence, which gives men suitable remedies for various causes and in many ways.

## Q. VI: ARTICLE X

### Are Demons Forced to Work Miracles by Sensible and Corporeal Objects, Deeds Or Words?

THE tenth point of inquiry is whether demons by sensible and corporeal objects, deeds, or words, be forced to work the miracles that seem to be wrought by magic: and seemingly they can.

1. Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9) quotes Porphyry as saying that a certain man in Chaldea was seized with envy and by adjuring the spiritual powers, bound them with his imprecations not to grant the prayers of any other. And (ibid. 21) he says: Unless the demons first gave the information, it was not possible to know what any one of them desired or disliked, by what name he was to be invoked or compelled. Therefore demons are compelled to produce magical effects.

2. Whosoever does a thing against his will is in some way compelled. Now demons sometimes do a thing against their will when they are adjured by magicians. Thus it is always the devil's will to lead men into sin: and yet a man may be incited to base love by magic, and by the same art may be freed from the violence of the incitement. Therefore demons are compelled by magicians.

3. It is related of Solomon that he performed certain exercises and thereby compelled the demons to quit bodies that were obsessed by them. Therefore demons can be compelled by adjuration.

4. If demons come when evoked by a magician this is because they are either enticed or compelled. But they are not always evoked by being enticed: since sometimes they are adjured through things they hate, for instance through the virginity of the imprecator, whereas they themselves are ever inciting men to concubinage. Therefore seemingly they are sometimes compelled.

5. It is the devil's constant aim to turn man away from God. Nevertheless they obey the summons when they are adjured through things that imply that they revere God, for

instance by invoking God's majesty. Therefore they do this not willingly but under compulsion.

6. If so be that they are enticed by sensible objects it is not as animals are enticed by food, but as spirits are drawn by such signs as give pleasure, for instance different kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, chants, rites, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6). Yet apparently they are not drawn by signs; for only those are drawn by signs who make use of signs, and these are only those who are possessed of senses: inasmuch as a sign is that which besides the impression it makes on the senses brings something else to our knowledge. Therefore demons are in no way enticed but are only compelled.

7. A certain man said to Jesus (Mt. xvii, 14) Lord have Pity on my son, for he is a lunatic and sufferer much: and (Mk. ix, 16) it is said: I have brought my son to thee, having a dumb spirit. Now the (ordinary) gloss observes on the words quoted from Matthew: "Him Mark calls deaf and dumb whom Matthew describes as a lunatic, —not that the moon obeys the demons, but that the demon by observing the moon's course has an evil influence on man." It would seem, then, that by observing the heavenly bodies and other material things the demons may be compelled to do this or that.

8. Seeing that demons sinned by pride it is hardly likely that they are enticed by things that are derogatory to their superior nature. Yet they are adjured by invocations of their power and by the most incredible falsehoods, all of which is derogatory to their knowledge. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, ii) quotes Porphyry as saying: "Why should a weak man threaten, or seek by falsehood to extract the truth? for he will threaten to make the heavens fall and do other like things impossible to man, that the gods like silly children overawed by false and absurd threats may obey his behest." Therefore the demons are evoked not by being enticed but by being compelled.

9. The demons endeavour is to bring men to idolatry: and they compass this chiefly by their presence in images. Now if they came of their own accord, they would always come to such things. But they come only at certain times, and when invoked by certain chants and rites, and then only to certain consecrated or rather execrated images. Demons therefore are invoked not by being enticed but by compulsion.

10. Sometimes demons are invoked by magic art in order that they may turn men to base love. But demons endeavour to do this of their own accord: wherefore there would be no use in enticing them to do this if they did so whenever they were invoked. Now they do not so always. Therefore when they do they are invoked, not as being enticed but as, being compelled.

On the contrary, it is written (Job xii, 24): There is no power upon earth that can be compared with him, namely the devil. Now a greater power is not compelled by a lesser. Therefore nothing on earth can compel the demons.

Again, to be invoked and to be compelled apply to different subjects: we invoke those who are above, and we compel those who are beneath, according to Porphyry. Now demons come when called: therefore they are not compelled.

Should anyone say that they are compelled by the power of God: I reply, on the contrary, that to compel the demons by (calling upon) the power of God is the effect of the gift of grace whereby the order of heavenly powers is fulfilled. Now this gift is not in unbelievers and wicked men like sorcerers. Therefore neither can the demons be compelled by invoking the divine power. Again, it is no sin to do what is done chiefly by the divine power, for instance to work miracles. If then magicians were to compel the demons by the power of God, they would not sin in employing the magic arts; which is plainly false. Therefore the demons cannot in any way be compelled by magic.

I answer that there have been many opinions about the things done by the magic arts. Some, like Alexander, have said that the effects produced by magic are the result of powers and energies engendered in the lower world by the forces in these lower bodies combined with an observation of the heavenly movements. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, i) states that Porphyry believed that it is possible for men to employ herbs, stones, animals, certain sounds and voices, figures and various forms of trickery as well as by observing the movement of the stars in the revolution of the heavens, to conjure up forces conducive to the various effects of the stars. This opinion seems to be inadequate: since, although the natural forces of higher and lower bodies may suffice to produce some of the results ascribed to witchcraft, such as certain transmutations of bodies, nevertheless there are certain results of magic that are altogether beyond the scope of material forces. For it is plain that speech can only come from an intelligence: and magicians cause spoken answers to be heard; wherefore this must proceed from an intelligence, especially seeing

that these answers sometimes convey information about hidden matters. Nor can it be said that this is done by influencing the imagination alone by some kind of trickery: because in that case these voices would not be heard by all the bystanders, nor could they be heard by those who are awake and have the use of their senses. It follows then that these answers proceed either from the mind of the magician or from some outside intellectual agency.

The former is impossible for two reasons. First, because a man's mind cannot by its own power come to the knowledge of hidden matters except through matters known to him: so that by its will it is unable to effect the revelation of hidden matters, which is produced by the magic arts, since the principles of reason are insufficient to lead to the knowledge of those hidden matters. Secondly, because if the magician's mind produced these results by its own power, it would not need to resort to invocations or other like external means.

It is clear, therefore, that these results of magic are produced by some external spirits: not however by righteous and good spirits; and this is clear for two reasons, First, because good spirits would not associate themselves with wicked men, such as are the majority of magicians; secondly, because they would not co-operate with man in wrong-doing, which is often the result of magic. It remains then for us to conclude that they are produced by evil spirits whom we call demons.

These demons may be said to be compelled in two ways first by a higher power that forces them to act of necessity secondly, by way of enticement, even as a man is said to be compelled to do something when he is drawn by his desire. In neither way, however, properly speaking, can demons be compelled by material things: unless we suppose them to have aerial bodies naturally united to them and consequently sensible affections like other animated beings: thus Apuleius believed that demons are animals with aerial bodies and passive souls. For in that case they could be compelled in either way by a corporeal power; either of the heavenly bodies (by whose action they might be led to certain passions) or of these lower bodies which might be to them an object of pleasure: thus Apuleius says that "they delight in the smoke of sacrifices and such like things." This opinion, however, has been shown to be false in the previous Articles.

We conclude then that the demons which give success to the magic art may be both compelled and enticed. They are compelled by a higher being: sometimes by God himself, —sometimes through the divine power by holy angels and men. Thus the demons are said

to be curbed by the angelic brder of Powers. Holy men, even as they participate in the gift of the Virtues inasmuch as they work miracles, so do they share in the gift of the Powers inasmuch as they cast out devils. Sometimes too they are compelled by superior demons; and this compulsion alone can be effected by means of, magic. They may also be compelled, being as it were enticed, by the magic arts, not indeed by means of corporeal things for their own sake, but for the sake of something else. First because they are aware that the result for which they are invoked can be more easily produced by such corporeal things: and they want their power to be an object of admiration: and for this reason they are more ready to obey the summons when they are invoked under certain constellations. Secondly, in so far as these corporeal things are sips of certain spiritual things that please them. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6) says that demons are enticed by these things not as animals are by food, but as spirits by signs. For seeing that men in token of their subjection to God offer sacrifice and prostrate themselves, the demons delight in having such tokens of reverence offered to them. Moreover different demons are enticed by different signs as corresponding better to their various vices. Thirdly, they are enticed by those corporeal things which lead men into sin: for this reason they are enticed by lies or anything that deceives men or leads them into sin.

Reply to the First Objection. Demons are said to be compelled by magic art in the ways given above.

Reply to the Second Objection. The demon is quite content if by preventing an evil and promoting a good he makes it easier for him to draw men into familiar converse, with him, and to become an object of admiration to them: thus they even transform themselves into angels of light (2 Cor. xi, 14).

Reply to the Third Objection. If Solomon performed these exorcisms when he was in a state of grace, they could derive the power to compel the demons from the power of God. But if it was after he had turned to the worship of idols, so that we have to understand that he performed them by magic arts, these exorcisms had no power to compel the demons, except in the manner explained above.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The demons come when invoked by virgins, in order to lead men to think that they are divine, as though they loved purity.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Again, by coming when adjured by the invocation of the divine majesty, they wish men to think that they are not utterly banished by the justice of God. For they do not desire to be as gods, as altogether equal to God, but rejoice in receiving from men divine worship under him.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Demons are not said to be enticed by signs as though they used signs, but seeing that men are wont to employ signs, they take pleasure in the signs employed by men on account of what they signify.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. As the ordinary gloss observes (*ibid.*) demons afflict men more at certain phases of the moon, in order to bring God's creatures into evil repute, by the fact that men believe them to serve the demons and thus deceive men.

Reply to the Eighth, Objection. Although such lies would seem derogatory to the demons' power: yet it pleases them that men believe in these lies: because the devil is a liar and the father of lies.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. The demons become present to images when invoked at certain hours and by certain signs, for reasons already given.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although the demons ever desire to draw men into sin: they endeavour to do so all the more when they have a greater incentive, and when there is a likelihood of a greater number being drawn into sin.

## QUESTION VII

### THE SIMPLICITY OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE

THERE are eleven points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is simple. (2) Whether God's substance or essence are the same as his being. (3) Is God in any genus? (4) Whether

'good,' 'just,' 'wise' and the like predicate an accident in God. (5) Whether the aforesaid terms signify the divine substance. (6) Whether these terms are synonymous. (7) Whether these terms are said of God and creatures univocally or equivocally. (8) Is there any relation between God and the creature? (9) Whether the relations between God and creatures are really in creatures. (10) Whether God is really related to the creature, so that the relation be something in God. (11) Whether temporal relations are in God only logically.